



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AMAZIGH-STATE RELATIONS IN MOROCCO AND
ALGERIA**

by

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June 2013

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

| | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 2. REPORT DATE June 2013 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AMAZIGH-STATE RELATIONS IN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) John E. Kruse III | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | | |
| 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number <u>N/A</u> . | | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE |
| 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) | | |
| <p>As some of North Africa's original inhabitants, the indigenous Amazigh population in Morocco and Algeria has withstood waves of invaders to retain a distinct cultural and linguistic identity that has persisted within—and despite—nearly fourteen centuries of Arab rule. The emergence of Morocco and Algeria as modern nation-states following their independence marked the beginning of an ongoing tension between each state and its ethnic Amazigh minorities. With one state (i.e., Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e., Algeria), what are the factors that explain the different outcomes in both states? This study compares the two movements in Algeria and Morocco by investigating the relative salience of two central variables—that of each state's institutions and the behavior of its movements—on the outcomes for the Amazigh community. The major finding is that state institutions stand as the most potent variable due to their ability to channel movement strategies towards either militancy or accommodation. This power is largely illustrated through Morocco's reliance on cooptation as an initial response to expressions of grievance that has produced a milder form of activism. In contrast, Algeria has defaulted to a more repressive approach (to any dissent) that has produced a strident activism with radical offshoots. Movement behavior continues to play a secondary role that largely hinges on its ability to use globalization as an amplifying and mobilizing instrument for international pressure.</p> | | |

| | | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS Amazigh, Berber, Tamazight, Morocco, Algeria, Tamazgha, Tifinagh, identity politics, ethnicity, ethnic conflict, Arabization, colonialism, Berber Spring, Kabyle, Rif, free men, Imazighen, Rif, Souss, IRCAM | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 117 | |
| | | 16. PRICE CODE | |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU |

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AMAZIGH-STATE RELATIONS IN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

As some of North Africa's original inhabitants, the indigenous Amazigh population in Morocco and Algeria has withstood waves of invaders to retain a distinct cultural and linguistic identity that has persisted within—and despite—nearly fourteen centuries of Arab rule. The emergence of Morocco and Algeria as modern nation-states following their independence marked the beginning of an ongoing tension between each state and its ethnic Amazigh minorities. With one state (i.e., Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e., Algeria), what are the factors that explain the different outcomes in both states?

This study compares the two movements in Algeria and Morocco by investigating the relative salience of two central variables—that of each state's institutions and the behavior of its movements—on the outcomes for the Amazigh community. The major finding is that state institutions stand as the most potent variable due to their ability to channel movement strategies towards either militancy or accommodation. This power is largely illustrated through Morocco's reliance on cooptation as an initial response to expressions of grievance that has produced a milder form of activism. In contrast, Algeria has defaulted to a more repressive approach (to any dissent) that has produced a strident activism with radical offshoots. Movement behavior continues to play a secondary role that largely hinges on its ability to use globalization as an amplifying and mobilizing instrument for international pressure.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|--|
| AMREC | Moroccan Association of Research and Cultural Exchange |
| AZETTA | Amazigh Network for Citizenship |
| CMA | World Amazigh Congress |
| CERD | Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| EIU | Economist Intelligence Unit |
| INALCO | National Institute of Languages and Eastern Civilizations |
| IRCAM | Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FIS | Islamic Salvation Front |
| FFS | Socialist Forces Front |
| FLN | National Liberation Front |
| GEB | Berber Studies Group |
| GIA | Islamic Salvation Front |
| HCA | High Authority Agency |
| LADDH | Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights |
| MAK | Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie |
| MCA | Amazigh Cultural Movement in Morocco |
| MCB | Berber Cultural Movement in Algeria |
| MSA | Modern Standard Arabic |
| OADL | Amazigh Observatory of Rights and Freedoms |
| PDAM | Moroccan Democratic Amazigh Party |
| PI | Istiqlal Party |
| PJD | Justice and Development Party |
| PPA | Party of the Algerian People |
| RCD | Rally for Culture and Democracy |
| SNED | National Society of Publishing and Distribution for Algeria |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| WAC | World Amazigh Congress |

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Jesus, who cried with us in our grief and tears last year—then quieted us with His love—blessing my wife and I with two beautiful daughters here in Monterey. I thank my best friend and wife, Emily: Your selfless dedication to our family made all my work here possible; you are my heart. I thank my baby girls, Macee and Betty. God wrote your names on our hearts before we even knew you. We love you. Thank you to my mother, who read me books as a child and made countless trips to the library with me. Thank you to my father, who modeled an intellectual curiosity for me that has had a lifetime influence.

I offer a special thanks to all of the library staff, especially the workhorses of the Interlibrary loan system, whose patience and dedication made the arduous process of research easier. Of course, I would be remiss not to thank Dr. Hafez and Dr. Mabry, two professors who illustrated the awe-inspiring and wonderful magic that is great teaching. Whether it was your classroom or your office, I always departed with a deepened understanding and piqued curiosity.

Last, I want to thank the community at Shoreline Church, Compassion Pregnancy Center, Terry Wichert, Bob Reehm, and the Wednesday morning guys: Your prayers and friendships sharpened me as a Christian, husband and father.

“Admission (of one’s ignorance) is a specific (religious) duty.” –Ibn Khaldun

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

As ancient inhabitants of North Africa, the Amazigh populace has survived more than a millennium of invasions and oscillating regime policies.¹ Over the centuries their identity has oscillated between a proud ethnic one, a dormant marginalized one, an insular tribal one and one struggling for its voice in society. Their ability to survive and to maintain a distinct ethnic and linguistic identity throughout it all has largely been a product of negotiations and interactions with ruling regimes and an ability to balance an ethos of fierce resistance (and independence) with an evolving concept of their own group identity. These group identities (i.e., the regional Amazigh tribes unique to Algeria and Morocco) have remained in various degrees of tension with a gradually developing Arab-Islamic identity since the Arab invasion in the seventh century (see Figure 1 for a map of Amazigh groups in the two states today). During the battle for colonial independence, the Amazigh consistently fought against the French and Spanish occupiers. After independence, however, these two states each embraced unique forms of government and experienced subsequent, but varied, periods of political instability and violence due to regime changes and rebellion. Throughout this process, Islamism (i.e., political Islam) developed and emerged as a major movement while a collective national identity superseded the Amazigh one for several decades. This substrata Amazigh identity existed only passively until the rise of identity politics in the 1970s. With the advent of globalization, an increasingly mobilized Amazigh movement would actively pursue language objectives beginning in the 1990s and continuing into the new century.

¹ Mordechai Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression*, 2nd




Figure 1. Map of Moroccan and Algerian Amazigh groups (From Leclerc, 2006)

In Morocco today, the Amazigh movement remains strong but divided. King Mohammed VI's July 2001 creation of *l'Institut Royal de Culture Amazighe* (IRCAM) has created a split that still exists today with many members of the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCA) refusing to participate in what they view as the monarchy's attempt to co-opt and temper their movement.² Politically, Amazigh activists have increasingly rejected the loyalist *Mouvement Populaire* (MP); the most radical activists forming the *Parti Democratique Amazighe Marocaine* (PDAM) in 2005. This party was eventually banned by the Moroccan judiciary as illegal due to legislative prohibitions on regional or ethnic political parties.³ After the widespread protests fueled by the Arab Spring's success in neighboring Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the movement won recognition of *Tamazight* as an official language alongside Arabic. Even this victory remains a subject of controversy with some in the

² As Maddy-Weitzman points out, the MCA is the Moroccan version of the older Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) that originated in Algeria. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Ethno-Politics and Globalization in North Africa: The Berber Culture Movement," *Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. 1 (March 2006): 81.

³ Michael J. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 220–222.

movement lambasting it as only a token concession by the palace and part of a broader (and successful) effort to weaken the February 20th movement.⁴

Despite being overwhelmingly concentrated in the Kabylie region of Algeria, the *Mouvement Culturel Berbère* (MCB) has been consistent in its longtime advocacy for linguistic and cultural recognition of Imazighen as a whole versus Kabylie regionally. This national outlook is not monolithic, though, in 2001 Kabyle singer and activist Ferhat Mehenni created the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK). The MAK asserts that because the MCB and long-time Amazigh-supported opposition political parties (e.g., *Front des Forces Socialistes* [FFS] and *Rassemblement pour la Culture Democratie* [RCD]) have all failed in effecting reform within the Algerian state as a whole, the focus should shift for reform at the regional level. Based in Paris, however, the MAK remains an outlier, especially due to its radical pro-Israel stance. Overall, the Amazigh movement in Algeria remains hamstrung in its efforts to promote a national agenda by its weak regional political base and geographic seclusion. The future of the movement may hinge on its ability to leverage its demands for recognition of its cultural and linguistic autonomy with an agreement to cooperate in pursuing burgeoning Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) forces in the mountainous Kabylie regions.⁵

The past 40 years have witnessed considerable struggles for the sizable Amazigh minority populations in both states. There is an opportunity to investigate the outcomes of these struggles vis-a-vis the Algerian and Moroccan state policies. This examination of state-movement relations may explain the two different outcomes for Amazigh populations in both states as affected by the state institutions. With one state (i.e., Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e., Algeria), what are the factors that explain the different outcomes in both states? Since the emergence of an Amazigh group identity in the late 1970s through the Arab Spring to 2012, has one factor been most influential and emerged most consistently, or are the explanations specific to time and state? This thesis seeks to identify and analyze

4 “North Africa’s Berbers Get Boost from Arab Spring,” The Cortez Journal, May 5, 2012, <http://www.cortezjournal.com/>.

5 Willis, Politics and Power, 223–225.

the factors (i.e., the nature of the state institutions, the nature of the movement behavior, or some combination of the two) that influence Algerian and Moroccan state interactions with their Amazigh minority populations.

Finally, the nomenclature used to describe the Amazigh—or Berber—populace is one of much debate. There is not widespread consensus among activists, scholars, or historians as to which term (i.e., Amazigh or Berber) is most appropriate. Much of this opacity is due to a lack of clarity as to the origin of the term *berber*. 14th century scholar and historian Ibn Khaldun claims the name *Berber* was given to the group by a raiding Yemeni king named Qays B. Sayfi (who lived during “the time of Moses or somewhat earlier”). After he heard some of its members speak, the king demanded to know what their *barbarah* (i.e., their unintelligible language) was.⁶ Others claim the term is derived from the Greek term *barbaros*, meaning “foreign, strange, ignorant.” In Sanskrit, the term *Barbara* meant “stammering” or “non-Aryan.” Regardless, the term for many carries a definite pejorative and subservient tone due to its use by successive waves of conquering forces (i.e., Romans, Vandals, Byzantines and Arabs).⁷ These negative implications are easily avoided through the use of the term *Amazigh* that translates literally as “free man.” The term *Imazighen* is the plural form of the noun. The term *Tamazgha* describes their land, and *Tamazight* the Amazigh language in a generic, general sense (specific geographically-based dialects will be delineated accordingly). In order to prevent any unnecessary offense, this thesis will use the *Tamazight* terms whenever possible or practical.⁸

B. IMPORTANCE

This thesis will produce meaningful conclusions concerning state-movement interactions in Morocco and Algeria. These conclusions will serve as a theoretical contribution to current scholarship on the Amazigh identity and the movement’s level of influence within the context of the state, as well as a more general contribution to existing

⁶ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah, an Introduction to History*, ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), 21–22.

⁷ Online Etymology Dictionary. last accessed April 5, 2012, <http://www.etymonline.com/>.

⁸ The letters “gh” are pronounced in the same manner as the French letter “r” in the Paris.

literature on ethnic conflict and its resolution within the state. Determining the specific factors that produced specific outcomes for the Imazighen in each state historically can serve as a guide to analyze future Amazigh-state interactions. Furthermore, by providing a complete framework (i.e., from the historical interactions to the accompanying causal factors to the specific outcomes) this thesis will stand as an instrument for a “thicker,” more holistic analysis of other similar ethnic minorities in the future.

In addition, the undercurrent to this examination of Amazigh-state relations is the rise and success of Islamism (i.e., political Islam). Often misunderstood due to its complexity, political Islam as a potential opponent to liberal democracy remains a widespread concern for the international community nonetheless. Radical Islamism (i.e., violent political Islam) then stands as an immediate and direct concern for the West due to its essentialist ideology and rejection of pluralist and democratic ideals. Most notably, understanding the factors that affected the social and political outcomes for Amazigh populations in Algeria and Morocco allows one to analyze the efficacy and plausibility of the Amazigh identity as a counterweight to, or a tempering agent for, Islamism. As Michael Willis observes, this counterweight notion derives from the salience of the Arab identity and its language as predominant, and minority identities and languages as marginal within Islam—this importance standing in direct tension with the Amazigh movement in Maghrib politics.⁹ This tension is then further aggravated because Imazighen tend to be seen as pluralistic, strongly embracing an identity that puts each state’s point of origin (i.e., as a nation)—not with the Arab-Islamic conquest but with the indigenous Amazigh people of the greater Maghreb region. A measured evaluation of this issue will have geostrategic implications for increasing stability within the Maghrib. Evidence of this geostrategic importance is seen in Algeria’s Kabylie region—a longtime stronghold of AQIM due to its economic destitution and geographic isolation—where Imazighen have recently begun cooperating with government security forces to oust Al Qaeda from the region.¹⁰

⁹Willis, *Politics and Power*, 217–220.

¹⁰ Alexis Arieff, *Algeria: Current Issues*, CRS Report RL21532 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2013).

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The arrival of French colonial forces to North Africa sparked a near fetishistic fascination with regard to the Amazigh people. As the French presence grew in the 19th century, scholars and physicians produced an outpouring of literature that depicted the Amazigh as a race distinct from, and above, the savage Arabs—ironic considering many believe the term *Berber* to be derived from the moniker, *barbarian*. The dominant medical personality in 1830’s Algeria was its chief army surgeon and professor of medicine Lucien Baudens. He would expound upon the courage and perseverance of the Kabyle Amazigh in contrast to the “cupidity, cruelty and fanaticism” of the Arabs in the widely read *Revue de Paris* (1838).¹¹ Physician Eugene Bodichon would add to this characterization in his 1845 account of the Algerian colonial situation, *Considerations sur l’Algérie*. This description would deride the Arabs as void of any redeeming qualities while extolling the Imazighen as a “pure primitive race” with an innate understanding of honor and truth.¹² While these accounts and others were specific to Algeria, they were endemic of the rise and acceptance of French pseudo-scientific racism prevalent throughout France and institutionalized within the Société d’Anthropologie de Paris.¹³

Contemporary writing on the Imazighen has diverged from its ignominious roots and has produced an impressive body of works for such a (relatively) small ethnicity.¹⁴ In order to comprehensively address this research question, a dual track approach will be used to examine two separate bodies of work. First, an examination of the literature specific to the Amazigh will show the highlights and shortcomings concerning analysis of Amazigh-state movement relations. Then, a canvas of the literature specific to ethnic conflict will be made, paying particular attention to the analysis of the methods states use to deal with ethnic minorities.

¹¹ Patricia M. E. Lorcin, “Imperialism, Colonial Identity, and Race in Algeria, 1830–1870: The Role of the French Medical Corps,” *ISIS* 90, no. 4 (1999), 661–2.

¹² *Ibid.*, 667–9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 672–4.

¹⁴ Most estimates place the proportion of Berbers at 40% in Morocco and 25% in Algeria, with Berber-speaking populations of approximately 10 million and 6 million, respectively, in each state.

1. Moroccan and Algerian Imazighen

Significant scholarship accompanied the reemergence of the Amazigh movement with the rise of identity politics in the 1970s. The most significant work being Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud's compendium of scholarly essays entitled *Arabs and Berbers* (1973). While not directly addressing the issue of state interactions with their Amazigh populations, the work is important because it addresses the very existence and identity of the Amazigh people. An inflammatory notion today, *Arabs and Berbers* refuted the idea of the Imazighen as an ethnicity, instead asserting that they were more likely to identify themselves as members of a tribe or region, or as part of the greater Islamic *ummah* (i.e., religious community).¹⁵ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Katherine Hoffman persuasively refute this notion as they describe the rise of the Amazigh Culture Movement and its transnational ethno-cultural awareness. This movement fits well into Benedict Anderson's framework of an imagined community—not in the pejorative sense—but as a group of people espousing a common memory, history, culture and territory. Furthermore, the scope of Gellner and Micaud's work focused on “structuralism and segmentary theory” whereas the contemporary writing focuses on “historiographical and qualitative studies.”¹⁶

Michael Willis takes issue with two commonly offered explanations for the rise of the Amazigh identity—external (i.e., western states attempting to weaken Arab power and unity) and internal (i.e., the emergence of the Amazigh identity as the result of centuries of struggle under Arab dominance). Instead he argues the Amazigh identity to be an evolutionary one often based as much on self-perception as reality. Maddy-Weitzman casts doubts as to the veracity of a centuries-long struggle Amazigh narrative but acknowledges that this Amazigh “memory work” has been indelibly written and that

¹⁵ Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah Fernández, *North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation* (London: Routledge, 2008), 227–8; Ernest Gellner, “Political and Religious Organization of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas,” in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 59–66.

¹⁶ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, *The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 7–8; Katherine E. Hoffman and Susan Gilson Miller, *Berbers and Others: Beyond Tribe and Nation in the Maghrib* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 1–3.; Willis, *Politics and Power*, 206–7.

while an overreaction, it was necessary to combat the original dearth of Amazigh presence in the written history of either nation.¹⁷ In the Imazighen's case they rose among the perfect congruence of a global explosion of identity movements and sweeping Arabization policies and movements.¹⁸

Willis argues that the nature of the state affected the Amazigh outcome most shortly after colonial independence in the two states. In Algeria, the state language policy shaped early state-movement interaction whereas this friction was minimalized in Morocco through a concerted effort by the *makhzen* to coopt Amazigh military leadership.¹⁹ In 1980s Algeria, Willis argues that the primary influencing factor wavered between the nature of the Amazigh movement and the nature of their economy. Initially elite-driven, the Amazigh movement was adamant in pushing for pluralist policies. This pluralism, however, was less driven by an identity specific to the Imazighen and more driven by relative economic deprivation (e.g., the majority of the 2001 El-Kseur platform demands were for state-wide socioeconomic equity and freedom).²⁰ In Morocco, the monarchy used the perception of pluralism from the onset, co-opting Amazigh notables to counter-balance nationalist power within the Istiqlal Party (PI). Willis argues that in Morocco the primary influencing factor for the Amazigh outcome was the nature of the international movements, with their geographic incontiguity as a secondary one. These identity movements affected Moroccan perceptions, driving a flourishing of elite and urban Amazigh associations through the first decade of the 2000s. The geographic isolation of some Amazigh groups (specifically those in the Middle Atlas mountains), however, dampened the strength of the movement as a whole.²¹

Silverstein and Crawford argue that in Morocco, the Amazigh outcome largely derives from the co-optive nature of the state. They observe that prior to the creation of

¹⁷ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ed., *Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007).

¹⁸ Zoubir and Fernández, *North Africa*, 229–231.

¹⁹ The *makhzen* refers to a rural-elite alliance centered around the Moroccan monarchy; it is the center of all decision-making in Morocco. For more on its role see Malika Zeghal's *Islamism in Morocco*.

²⁰ Willis, *Politics and Power*, 218–219.

²¹ Ibid., 218–220.

l’Institut Royal de Culture Amazigh (IRCAM), mainstream Moroccans viewed Amazigh culture as a colonial invention. However, in Morocco’s case the nature of the state had a direct effect on the nature of the movement, splintering off a more radical group that viewed the Jews’ tribulations as the struggles of a kindred spirit.²² Nisan tackles the idea of cooptation from a different angle, describing the way in which Islam was able to coopt the Imazighen in a manner that the Romans, Vandals and Byzantines never were able to do. He points to language as the single largest factor affecting the Amazigh identity—the lack of a common unified spoken and written language rendered the Imazighen unable to resist cooptation in Morocco and engendered bitterness in Algeria where the government stripped the central tenet of their identity with repressive policies. Maddy-Weitzman argues that the nature of the state was affected by a brutal colonial period that produced a regime necessarily focused on its unity as an Arab nation—not on distinctive and unique ethnic identities.²³

Moroccan scholar Michael Peyron’s 2010 chastisement of fellow Amazigh scholars likely oversteps and devolves into minutiae, however, he is persuasive in calling for more complete research into French and Arab primary sources documents in concert with more fieldwork. He argues that rectification of this deficiency could prevent many misunderstandings about the Amazigh identity. He notes that some scholars have incorrectly asserted that *izerf* (i.e., Amazigh customary law) and *shari'a* have been so long intertwined that they are essentially the same. To the contrary he references research that shows the regret expressed by Atlas Imazighen at the diminishment of the *izerf*. Another common example centers on incorrect assertions by academics as to the origin of the 1930 *Dahir Berbère*. He notes that the PI actually coined this term and that it was a reworking of an earlier 1914 text that pertained to specific pacified Amazigh areas drafted by Resident-General of Morocco Hubert Lyautey.²⁴

²² Paul Silverstein and David Crawford, “Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State,” *MER: Middle East Report*, no. 233 (2004).

²³ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State in North Africa,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 3 (2001): 36–8.

²⁴ Michael Peyron, “Recent Cases of Incomplete Academic Research on Morocco’s Berbers,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 15, no. 2 (2010), 157–171.

2. Nations and States

Central to the state-movement relations is the tension between *nations* and *state*. Traditionally, a nation is defined in a quantifiable manner such as, “a community of people characterized by a common, language, territory, religion.”²⁵ This community of people can also be labeled an ethnicity. Politics (in this case) then is the drawing of the geographic borders for this nation. This defining of borders typically transforms a nation into a state. It was these types of nationalist tendencies that drove much of the movement for colonial independence in Algeria and France. Post-independence, the state in both cases made an assertion of nation-statehood (the coincidence of ethnicity and geographic borders) due to an authoritarian assumption of ethno-linguistic homogeneity. Rather than a structuralist reasoning, this assumption stemmed from a more primordialist argument of a psychological glue that both bound and distinguished their populations through a shared Arab-Islamic blood (or at least the *perception* of it).²⁶ In both cases these official and unspoken policies meant the exclusion, suppression, or expulsion of the identities of various ethnic minorities (e.g., Jews and Imazighen) living within the borders of the state. These state interactions with ethnic minority populations are central to ethnic conflict studies. Examining the relevant literature then is paramount to understanding Amazigh-state movement relations.

3. Ethnic Conflict Literature

In most cases, the mere presence of an ethnic minority is a harbinger for ethnic conflict within a state. Much of the predominant theory focuses on relative economic and political deprivation as an explanation for ethnic conflict. Marie Besançon argues that the more unequal economically that ethnic groups are, the lower the probability of ethnic violence but much higher the chance of revolution. He further argues that the more unequal the educational opportunities, the lower the chance of revolution, but the higher

²⁵ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 197.

²⁶ Ibid.

the chance of ethnic conflict.²⁷ In *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Walker Connor takes case with this prevailing assumption that economic inequality drives ethnic conflict and proffers political deprivation as a more comprehensive explanation. Regardless of the argument, the bulk of evidence is circumstantial and local with scant evidence to show a pervasive and broad causal (not just correlative) relationship between inequality and ethnic conflict. This incomplete argument must be acknowledged then when evaluating Amazigh access to the economic, educational and political system. An additional difficulty is present in Morocco and Algeria with varying degrees of political access (in terms of ability to influence meaningful change) for *any* member of society, regardless of ethnicity, due to the authoritarian nature of the regime (i.e., with all the true decision-making cemented in the *makhzen* and *le Pouvoir*).²⁸

Shifting from drivers of ethnic conflict, it is fundamental to examine state solutions to these real and perceived differences. State options in dealing with ethnic minority grievances run the gambit: from genocide to expulsion to assimilation to integration to multiculturalism to partition to secession. Bell-Fialkoff opines that states most often embrace policies such as expulsion and ethnic cleansing with politically unreliable or dangerous populations.²⁹ While both states likely employed this policy against their Jewish inhabitants after independence, the regimes never viewed the Amazigh populations in this manner. Thus, the majority of state-Amazigh policies over the last three decades have fallen into the assimilation/integration/multiculturalism categories.

The Amazigh movement's struggle is one that wavers between the goal of some form of measured political/legal/lingual autonomy (with the exception of smaller radical groups such as the MAK that seek regional autonomy) and multi-culturalism.³⁰ In the

²⁷ Marie L. Besançon, “Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides,” *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 4 (2005), 393–415.

²⁸ *Le Pouvoir* literally translates as “those who are able to do” and refers to the political-military complex that controls power in Algeria.

²⁹ Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993), 111.

³⁰ Al Jazeera, “Berbers in North Africa,” last modified January 23, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2010/01/2010121125817226470.html>

case of state-Amazigh movement relations, this tension and conflict is most firmly vested in lingual identity.

While assimilation is most often associated with immigrant populations, it holds relevance for indigenous (or close to it) populations as well, as Nathan Glazer shows in his examination of the failure of assimilation with regard to African-Americans in the United States.³¹ Alba and Nee write that assimilation can be defined as the decline, and at its endpoint, the disappearance of an ethnic and racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it.³² For a long period this was the policy of the United States until it shifted to a more accepting (of cultural specificities) multi-culturalist one. As Herbert Gans points out, key to this debate is whether assimilation can actually be equated with social mobility—he argues that the two are still independent processes.³³ As Glaser argues, assimilation policies are nearly universally disdained and for good reason—they value the imposition an ethnocentric and patronizing framework over retention of cultural and ethnic integrity.³⁴ Thus, a state most often seeks to assimilate a group in an effort to consolidate power and promote stability as occurred most often in Algeria.

A more progressive policy was seen in Morocco as it shifted from early assimilative and expulsionary (i.e., the expelling of undesirables) policies toward a state policy of integration. This policy differs from assimilation in that with it the state seeks to combine two identities into one (e.g., Amazigh identity as an essential component of Moroccan identity). As Eiki Berg and Guy Ben-Porat point out, states can use integration to de-territorialize conflicts and accommodate an ethnic minority, although this is typically done in democracies (a term whose assignation to the political system in

³¹ Nathan Glazer, “Is Assimilation Dead?” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530 (1993): 122–136.

³² Ibid.

³³ Herbert J Gans, “Acculturation, Assimilation and Mobility,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30, no. 1 (2007), 152–164.

³⁴ Richard Alba and Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” *International Migration Review* 31, no. 4 (Winter, 1997): 826–827.

Algeria or Morocco would be highly suspect).³⁵ Multiculturalism leaps beyond mere integration and acknowledges an ethnicity and culture in the political and public sphere—notably this denotes a linguistic acknowledgement. Typically states employ this policy when the costs (i.e., political and economic) of “eliminating the difference” (i.e., the unique identity of an ethnic minority) become too high.³⁶ These costs can be the political pressure stemming from a movement’s mobilization or it can be a desire or need for a regime to increase its economic output. As David Laitin points out, the mobilization for linguistic autonomy (even in poor states) tends to be the least violent form of ethnic protest and when properly managed by the state can foster economic growth.³⁷

The instrumentalist theory of nationalism—that insists a specific person’s choices and actions can and do matter—must be acknowledged as it pertains heavily to the leadership personalities in Morocco and Algeria. As Elie Kedourie argues, leaders use nationalism as a tool to give order to the cacophony of competing political authorities.³⁸ Certainly this was done during the colonial independence movements in Algeria and Morocco as its leaders sought to promote stability and order amidst a potential political vacuum. While instrumentalist Brendan O’Leary has been criticized for assigning too much power to the elites and their ability to sway the masses, this criticism is less valid in more authoritarian regimes where the masses are mostly disenfranchised from the political process.³⁹ Michael Hechter argues that rational actors will respond to institutional solutions.⁴⁰ This hypothesis is important in comparing state interactions with Amazigh movement as they ultimately seek to maintain control and authority over their populace.

³⁵ Eiki Berg and Guy Ben-Porat. “Introduction: Partition vs. Power-sharing?” *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (2008): 29–37.

³⁶ David D. Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 112–115.

³⁷ Ibid., 133–34.

³⁸ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York: World Publishing, 1970), 28.

³⁹ Brendan O’Leary, *Nationality and Nationalism: Instrumentalist Theories of Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 148–152.

⁴⁰ Michael Hechter, “Nationalism and Rationality,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 1 (2000), 3–19.

Marc Howard Ross argues that the most effective solutions to ethnic conflict are found in comprehensive institutional solutions.⁴¹ For such a solution to be comprehensive, though, it requires a rewriting and reworking of psychocultural narratives, symbols and dramas to find a common identity. Clark McCauley aptly captures the reasoning and goal of such a rewriting: “the psychological foundation of ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict is group identification—an emotional attachment to a political group. The individual feels part of a group of people who are willing to sacrifice for the group . . . the group must recognize mutual feeling for their nation.”⁴² This observation captures well the ongoing struggle of ethnic and national identity in Algeria and Morocco.

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

At the most basic level this paper seeks to determine the reason that the interactions of two largest states in North Africa with their minority Amazigh populations produced different outcomes. The underlying assumption then asserts that important differences exist between the two states—both in regimes themselves and in their indigenous Amazigh populations.

My primary hypothesis is that it is the nature of each state’s institutions and accompanying political system that most affects the outcome for its ethnic minority. There is consensus that from the onset Morocco has been more pluralistic politically, employing a primary strategy of cooptation through the structure of the *makhzen*. Rather than ever completely eliminating threats to the monarchy, the Moroccan kings have instead played palace opponents off one another to reduce each opponent’s power. Repression and bribery remains a secondary instrument for unruly opposition. For Moroccan Imazighen this has meant a series of graduated concessions of questionable value and sincerity. In contrast, Algeria was not initially politically pluralistic and it has

⁴¹ Marc Howard Ross, *Culture and Belonging in Divided Societies: Contestation and Symbolic Landscapes* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 295.

⁴² Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” in *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions*, ed. D. Chirot and M. Seligman, (Washington, DC: American Psychological Assoc., 2001) 348.

historically been exclusionary of dissenting voices. Scholars agree that the nature of the Algerian state was deeply affected by its divergent (from that of Morocco) colonial experience. The brutality of French occupation and decolonization imprinted a societal mentality seeking a monolithic identity (one diametrically opposed to a French identity) after independence. While Algeria's political system did eventually open (at least nominally), it has remained dominated by the National Liberation Front (FLN) party, the natural resource industry and the political-military complex called, *le Pouvoir*. Unlike in Morocco, the stalwart grip of executive power in Algeria derives its legitimacy from the backing of a strong military and a ubiquitous military intelligence service (i.e., Department of Intelligence and Security—the DRS).⁴³ In both states this hypothesis falls in step with an instrumentalist theory on ethnic conflict—both states have been dominated by strong leadership personalities as well as influential elites. The extent of state-institutional solutions will be examined within this supposition.

My secondary hypothesis is that the nature of the Amazigh movement in each state has most affected the outcomes. In Algeria, all contemporary opposition activity is shaped by the memory of the decade long bloodbath between the radical Islamists and a repressive regime. This corporate memory may have prompted overreaction from the security apparatus such during the “Black Spring” of 2001 when the government forces killed 126 rioters protesting the murder of an Amazigh teenager killed while in custody.⁴⁴ This event and consequent lingual discrimination has caused a chasmic mistrust of the government despite grudging concessions on language and identity. In Morocco, scholars argue that elite and urban influence most heavily shaped the Amazigh movement with the bulwark of its momentum created under the framework of international identity movements.

⁴³ Arieff, *Algeria*, RL21532, 3.

⁴⁴ Alexis Arieff, *Algeria: Current Issues*, CRS Report RS21532 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2011), 9-10.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

The methodology of this thesis is a comparative study of the two largest states in the Maghrib, one with a large geographically spread out Amazigh population and the other with a smaller but generally more concentrated Amazigh population. This methodology presumes the state to be the largest actor in the public and private discourse and assumes that it acts in its own self-interest to the goal of regime preservation. In this thesis the dependent variable is the different Amazigh outcomes within each state. The independent variables then align with the two hypotheses as to the factor that most influenced the outcomes. Since the two states have both similarities and very important differences (i.e., economic, political, geographic, and historical diversions), one can expect degrees of variation in both the causal factors and the outcomes (as well as the pace of reforms leading to those outcomes). These multiple levels of analysis and comparison will then yield a thick and descriptive understanding of state-Amazigh movement interactions in Algeria and Morocco.

While many of the possible causal factors have been explored previously in segmented approaches, they have not been evaluated in this comparative manner that spans from colonial independence to the Arab Spring. An examination of primary source documents will be important to determine the level of influence for each factor. In addressing the nature of state institutions as the causal factor, constitutional changes, royal declarations and formal and informal bureaucratic practices must be examined. The Amazigh movement will be evaluated using news reporting, official and unofficial (i.e., not sanctioned by the government) charters and statements from Amazigh movements and political parties, as well as reports by international organizations such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

My second chapter will be the primary hypothesis that examines the nature of both states' institutions from their colonial independence up to present day. It will trace the evolution of those institutions, political parties and official government policies. This chapter will emphasize the role of each nation's king or president (addressing state

leadership in the context of instrumentalism) and is divided into three periods. The first section will analyze the effects of each state's struggle for independence on the Imazighen as well as the Amazigh role during and immediately afterwards. The next section will address regime policies of Arabization as they affected the Amazigh populace in each state. Finally, the chapter will address each state's policies and concessions to the Amazigh activists beginning at the dawn of the 21st century.

The third chapter will examine the nature, breadth and role of the Amazigh movements in the region. It is divided into three parts with the first section addressing the role of the Amazigh in a region's history that carries an overwhelming Arab-Islamic bias. Comparing each state's version of Amazigh history with that of the Amazigh movements themselves will give context to the existing tensions. Discussions of Amazigh origins still bring about considerable debate among scholars and politicians—this debate will be encapsulated here. The next section addresses the Amazigh movement at independence and its faltering attempts at mobilization. The last section is the focus of the chapter and it will address the Amazigh movement as an identity movement that has struggled to find its footing and role in each state beginning in the 1970s and up through the Arab Spring.

The concluding chapter will offer a synthesis and measured assessment of the previously discussed factors that have proved most influential to the Amazigh policy outcomes.

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II. STATE INSTITUTIONS AND AMAZIGH IDENTITY

This chapter examines the degree to which the nature of each state's institutions themselves proved influential to the outcomes for the Amazigh populations. In both states, this influence was wielded through restrictions on language policy and political parties. When evaluating Amazigh outcomes in terms of language policies—an examination of the nature of the each state's institutions is an obvious tact because the state itself exercises near total control over such policies within its own borders. Nowhere is this assumption more valid than in authoritarian states where there is no legal or procedural mechanism by which to respond to injustice. Aside from linguistic policies, one must also analyze another control mechanism—the interactions between the state and its control and manipulation of its political party system.

Despite protestations to the contrary (especially by Morocco's government)⁴⁵—neither state is a democracy—both states instead should be viewed as authoritarian ones. As shown in the following graphic from the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) 2012 Democracy Index, Morocco and Algeria have nearly identical scores. While Morocco barely qualifies as a hybrid regime (for the first time since the index began), Algeria firmly falls in the index's category for authoritarian regimes. With abysmal overall scores of 3.83 and 4.07 out of ten and worldwide ranks of 115th and 118th (for Morocco and Algeria respectively), both countries fall well short in categories of electoral process, pluralism, and political participation. Morocco's escape from categorization as an authoritarian regime is more a function of its government's marginal ability to

⁴⁵ Moroccans are quick to delineate between their legislature and the monarchy itself when they describe the nature of the regime. In a 2001 interview with *Le Figaro*, published September 4, 2001, Mohammed VI asserted that "Morocco is a democracy" as he referred to upcoming fall parliamentary elections. A 29 August 2009 *Economist* article, "Popular but Prickly, Morocco and its King," recounted a 2009 *Tel Quel* poll that found that nearly half of all Moroccans described Morocco as a democracy. Algeria has made similar claims as reported in the May 25, 1995 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. This report captured a May 23, 1995 speech on Algerian radio by Prime Minister Sifki in which he claimed that "Algeria is not a dictatorship; Algeria is a democracy which is building itself with its opposition parties..."

unction and enact policy (earning them a still-low 4.64) than an ethos that espouses liberal political empowerment and freedom.⁴⁶ Freedom House's 2013 report affirms the EIU's evaluation, calling Morocco only "partly free" and labeling Algeria as "not free."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Economist Intelligence Unit, "2012 Democracy Index: Democracy at a Standstill," last accessed May 10, 2013, <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12>.

⁴⁷ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance," last accessed May 10, 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Charts%20and%20Graphs%20for%20Web.pdf>.

Democracy Index 2012

| | Rank | Category scores | | | | | V Civil liberties |
|---------|------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | | Overall score | I Electoral process and pluralism | II Functioning of government | III Political participation | IV Political culture | |
| Algeria | 118 | 3.83 | 3.00 | 2.21 | 3.89 | 5.63 | 4.41 |
| Morocco | 115 | 4.07 | 3.50 | 4.64 | 2.78 | 5.00 | 4.41 |

Figure 2. Democracy Index (After 2012 Economist Intelligence Unit)

Central to the state's power is its ability to enact and enforce language policy. Language's role has been one of constant importance in the post-independence history of both countries as they strove to form national identities distinct from that of their French colonial masters. While the totality of Arab nationalism encompassed more than the Arabic language—the role of classical Arabic as a method of unification and as a distinguisher from previous colonial masters—has been paramount.⁴⁸ Both states' official espousal of Arabic's has had important intended and unintended effects on Amazigh outcomes throughout the last 60 years. Throughout much of that time period Tamazight remained firmly ensconced in the background, an afterthought in the battle between French, Arabic, and at times, *darija* (i.e., the local North African Arabic dialect).⁴⁹

As authoritarian states, the bulwark of decision-making power remains vested in the executive branch. While elections are held for the Parliaments, their members hold little real decision-making power. Instead the regulations for the political party system remain an instrument for each state's leader to maintain and consolidate power. As mentioned in the introduction the seat of power in both nations is cemented and protected by elite power groups (i.e., the *makhzen* in Morocco and *le Pouvoir* in Algeria). Much of the king and president's actions in both countries focus on placating these groups and manipulating them to consolidate personal power and wealth.

Algeria's bicameral Parliament is made up of a 144-seat Council of the Nation and a 462-seat National People's Assembly. The President of the state directly appoints one-third of the seats on the Council of the Nation, as well as the president of the government. The 462 seats of the People's Assembly are elected through a closed list proportional representation system.⁵⁰ Historically low voter turnout (oscillating between 30% to 45%) for the past decade of parliamentary elections is indicative of the

⁴⁸ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization and its Discontents: The Rise of the Amazigh Movement in North Africa,” *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 3, no. 2 (2012): 110.

⁴⁹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 111.

⁵⁰ Election Guide, “Algeria Election Profile,” last updated January 10, 2006, <http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=442>.

disenfranchisement of the populace.⁵¹ The recent dissolution of presidential term limits serves to further amplify the true seat of power within the nation.

Morocco also has a bicameral Parliament consisting of a 270-seat Chamber of Counselors and a 325-seat Chamber of Representatives. The President chooses the Prime Minister (i.e., the head of the government) from the party with the largest representation in parliament. The chamber of counselors is elected through an indirect vote (i.e., through local councils, professional and labor groups) and the representatives through a closed-list proportional representation system.⁵² Despite elections frequently touted as “free and fair” by the regime, the constitution renders the parliament relatively impotent. The constitution grants the king the right to relieve any parliament members, to dissolve the parliament entirely or to call for new elections at any time. The king is also able to veto any legislation or to create and issue his own decrees (i.e., *dahir*). The Arab Spring induced 2011 constitutional changes that delegated some measures of the king’s power to the prime minister (e.g., the right to dissolve parliament) but most reports have characterized the concessions as half-hearted cosmetic ones focused more on the retention of power than true reform. While the 2011 referendum enjoyed a 98.5% turnout (more suggestive of voter fraud than a free and fair vote), the turnout for the 2007 and 2011 legislative elections was only around 30%.⁵³ This electoral malaise is the best reflection of the monopoly on power enjoyed by the king and his palace loyalists.

While this authoritarian thread runs strongly through the fabric of each state’s history, the nature of this individual monopoly on power has not been a static one but has been dynamic, always changing to assure a continued power consolidation. This chapter demonstrates the divergent manner with which Morocco and Algeria have responded to dissent since independence. While not without instances of repression and violence,

⁵¹ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Data for Algeria,” last updated October 5, 2011, <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=66>.

⁵² Election Guide, “Morocco Country Profile,” last updated December 1, 2011, <http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=146>

⁵³ Paul Silverstein, “Weighing Morocco’s New Constitution,” Middle East Research and Information Project,” July 5, 2011. <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070511>; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Data for Morocco,” last updated October 5, 2011, <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=138>.

Morocco's primary and reflexive response has been to use its institutions (or to change and alter them) to coopt key opposition voices or parties. In contrast, Algeria's initial reaction to dissent has been the repression and exclusion of dissenting voices, the effects of which have rarely been softened by less severe behavior later on. In both countries, however, the personality and character of its president or king has firmly driven the state's narrative arc. These different leaders have then either amplified or reduced the extent of cooptation or repression through institutional manipulation of both language policies, as well as, restrictions on the political party system (i.e., the creation of artificial barriers to party formation and mobilization).

It is useful, therefore, to begin the assessment at Algeria and Morocco's birth as a modern state. The chapter begins by addressing the relevant language policies and institutional political changes throughout each state's colonial experience and their subsequent effects following independence. Then it compares both continued changes in policy during both states Arabization efforts during the 1970s and 1980s. The chapter continues by analyzing key events and the states' actions at the turn of the century through the Arab Spring. Each section is organized around the instrumental state leaders—only three for Morocco—with many more for Algeria. An examination of the way each state formed, manipulated and wielded its institutions to affect outcomes for its Amazigh population is readily apparent in its laws, official decrees, constitutions and amendments.

A. COLONIALISM AND THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE: MOHAMMED V AND AHMED BEN BELLA

The effects of each state's struggle for colonial independence are still evident today in Morocco and Algeria. Morocco's colonial experience came under the auspices of a protectorate. While a façade, the populace was given at least the semblance of self-governance. Their independence, claimed by Mohammed V on 18 November 1956, came more as the result of a political struggle than a physical one (especially when compared to Algeria—albeit not a struggle absent violence and bloodshed—which was formed and

driven from the Riffian Imazighen).⁵⁴ Algeria’s colonial experience on the other hand was complete and brutal (one without even the pretense of autonomy)—their independence on July 5, 1962 came as the fruit of a nearly decade-long bloody insurgency against the French. In both cases, the colonial experience physically unified previously autonomous and loosely connected territories and inculcated in its inhabitants the idea of a national identity. This idea would become a powerful instrument for the budding nationalists leading up to the struggle for independence.⁵⁵ In both states, the focus during this period was accordingly on the state political system and institutions versus language policies.

1. Morocco

Prior to colonization by the French, the Sultanate in Morocco had limited control over his own territory. With the majority of Amazigh tribes living in the remote and spread out mountain ranges, much of the Sultan’s rule had only a token effect on the many of the tribes living in the mountains. This relationship was characterized by a tension between the *bled al-makhzen* and *bled al-siba* (i.e., the land of the ruling elite and the land of dissidence). The Amazigh roots in the *bled al-siba* served as a counterweight and defense against the undemocratic values of the ruling class—this explains much of the lasting hostility today between the Amazigh movement and the ruling Fassis families.⁵⁶

It took the French over two decades (from 1912 to 1934) to completely “pacify” the tribes living in Morocco’s three mountain ranges (i.e., the Rif, Atlas and Anti-Atlas).⁵⁷ The French based these efforts on a mistaken understanding of the relationship between the Amazigh tribes and the Moroccan leadership structure. Most notably they assumed the entire reason for the traditional Amazigh resistance was due to their

⁵⁴ Nisan, “Minorities,” 1st ed., 59.

⁵⁵ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 114–115.

⁵⁶ Mickael Bensadoun, “The (re) Fashioning of a Moroccan National Identity,” in *Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 27.

⁵⁷ Jonathan Wyrtzen, “Colonial State-Building and the Negotiation of Arab and Berber Identity in Protectorate Morocco,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no.2 (2011): 229.

eschewal of *shar'ia*—thus Lieutenant Colonel Henrys' 1914 decree (that would eventually reappear as the infamous 1930 Berber *dahir*) supposed that by granting the Amazigh tribes judicial autonomy the French could curry favor and turn them against the ruling Arab class. This autonomy came at the expense of other freedoms (e.g., isolation, privacy, etc.) as the French government built up the infrastructure in the mountains and devoted considerable cartographic effort to study and classifying the country sides and tribal structures—all in the name of *la mission civilatrice*.⁵⁸

This true aim of the pacification campaign was not, of course, an elevation of the Imazighen but instead a harnessing of their military prowess and resources. Poems from the late 1920's and early 1930's reflect the Imazighen's mixed feelings of being conquered and forced to fight their own countrymen but also of pride in being relied upon by the French army.⁵⁹ Eventually the French taxes, labor practices and annexation of their tribal land would solidly mobilize both Amazigh resistance and their identification with the nationalist cause.⁶⁰

The rising Salafi nationalist surge recognized these efforts to “divide and conquer” and insisted on a unified Arab-Islamic front that drew from the nation's traditional historical narrative (as written by the Arab conquerors). This insistence was encapsulated in one of the nationalist rally cries: “do not separate us from our brothers, the Berbers.”⁶¹ It also meant that the nationalists called for a ban on Tamazight and insisted on the use of Islam as a unifier to consolidate resistance, even as the Sultan signed away valuable coastal lands and the central plains to the French.⁶² This rhetoric and effort was effective in shifting the rural mindset as by the 1940's most Imazighen began to demand that their children be sent to Arabic-speaking schools to ensure their upward mobility.⁶³

58 Wyrtzen, “Colonial State-Building,” 230–231.

59 Wyrtzen, “Colonial State-Building,” 243.

60 Mordechai Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East : A History of Struggle and Self-Expression*, 1st ed. (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1991), 59.

61 Wyrtzen, “Colonial State-Building,” 232.

62 Wyrtzen, “Colonial State Building,” 238.

63 Wyrtzen, “Colonial State Building,” 244.

Despite attempts by the French government to coopt the Imazighen during the colonial/protectionate period, Amazigh military leadership would prove essential to the nationalist battle for independence—indeed, a Riffian Amazigh was one of the leading fighters against the French.⁶⁴ Post-independence the Moroccan Army was led by an Amazigh from the Rif mountains; in all Imazighen made up 90% of its service members.⁶⁵

Shortly after independence in 1956, the *makhzen* formed alliances with the many of the influential Amazigh military leaders, effectively hamstringing any possible attempts at ethnic mobilization.⁶⁶ This fell squarely into the palace pattern of ruling by co-optation—the government exploited the rural Amazigh military prowess for the benefit of their Arab-centric political goals (i.e., independence, autonomy and post-colonial power consolidation).⁶⁷

Following independence several violent rebellions erupted to protest the government subjugation of rural objectives and needs, however, these uprisings were decidedly anti-PI (versus anti-monarchy). A rebellion occurred in both 1957 and 1958 (in Tafilalet in the South and the Rif in the North respectively) that was quickly and brutally put down by the newly consolidated Moroccan Royal Army under the leadership of then Crown Prince Hassan II.⁶⁸ Following independence, key opponents of any attempts at an Amazigh political voice was (and remains) the PI. PI leader Ben Barka (who would later leave the party to form the Union of Popular Forces [UNFP] opposition party) captured his party's sentiment during a 1958 interview in which lambasted the Amazigh people as a creation of the French. He further charged that the Imazighen held no ethnic particular identity—they were instead “simply someone who hadn’t been to school.”⁶⁹ Amazigh

64 Nisan, *Minorities*, 2nd ed., 69–70.

65 Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 60.

66 Michael J. Willis, “The Politics of Berber (Amazigh) Identity: Algeria and Morocco Compared,” in *North Africa : Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation*, eds. Yahia Zoubir and Haizam Amirah Fernández (NewYork, Routledge, 2008), 233–34.

67 Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 59.

68 Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 60.

69 Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 116.

activist and historian Ali Sidqi Azaykou characterized the PI efforts as tantamount to “cultural hegemony.” While such charges may have some validity, they fail to address the leadership roles of some Amazigh within the PI and other parties.⁷⁰

On 15 November 1958 the pragmatic king granted the right for cultural associations to form (specifically it granted the “freedom of association”) through a *dahir* (number 1–58–376.).⁷¹ This was not a particularly Amazigh-oriented concession but rather a method of elite political control. During the previous two years, the PI had stymied attempts by activists to organize by blocking legislation that would authorize the freedom to associate. The king effectively trumped their efforts and allowed activists the ability to meet, organize and plan.⁷² While these groups and others were now allowed to meet, there were (and continue to be 50 years later) numerous stipulations and a heavy dose of bureaucratic oversight that borders on outright monitoring and harassment.⁷³ In this respect, these the freedom to associate enable just one more method of surveillance that the regime used to direct and channel Amazigh activism.

Aside from the bifurcated loyalties within the Amazigh elite, the Mouvement Populaire (MP) emerged in 1959 as a political party that sought—ostensibly—to represent the demands of the Imazighen and to act as a rural counterweight to the urban-focused PI. In reality, their formation had little to do with representing the needs of the Amazigh people and much more to do with the political machinations of the king. Devised in part to quash PI aspirations of a single party political system, the MP was created at the prompting of the king to his loyal friend (and formed leader of the National Liberation army) Abdelkrim Khatib to join Mahjub Ahardan in leading and creating the

70 Maddy-Weitzman, *Maghrib*, 58–59.

71 John Laueremann, “Amazigh Nationalism in the Maghreb,” *The Geographic Bulletin* 50 (2009): 44. By 1996 there would be over 1000 of these cultural associations in existence.

72 Andrew Coram, “Notes on the Role of the Berbers in the Early Days of Moroccan Independence,” in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 270–272.

73 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “Freedom of Association in the Euro-Mediterranean Region,” last accessed May 10, 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/FAssociation/Responses2012/other_contributions/World-EMHRN2009_Annual_Report_on_Free_Association.pdf, 53–54.

MP.⁷⁴ This action was done in concert with the recruitment of Amazigh notables in key cabinet positions (all to the detriment and exclusion of PI members). While they would later promote an agenda focused on agrarian land reform (though in reality one more focused on land redistribution among the elite), their initial party goal was one solely devoted to supporting the seat of the monarchy above all other concerns.⁷⁵ These immediate post-independence actions by the king, however, represented concerted and deliberate efforts to maintain and improve relations with the base centers of rural resistance and power as a method to insure the legitimacy and security of the monarchy.⁷⁶ As illustrated, these relationships had little to do with the recognition of ethnicity or language and instead were key factors in established the initial power base for the king in the post-independence melée.

In 1961 Mohammed V put in their constitution's first article that Morocco was an Arab and Muslim kingdom and that Arabic was the nation's official and national language. In 1962 amidst tense relations with Egypt, however, Hassan II capitulated to a request from an Amazigh delegation and removed out the reference to the "Arab kingdom" as well as the reference to Arabic as a "national language"⁷⁷

2. Algeria

Algeria's colonial experience was characterized by much more brutality from the French occupying forces than was Morocco's considerably less violent protectorate experience. After extinguishing three centuries of Ottoman rule (which itself came after nine centuries of Arab rule) beginning in 1830, France came to view the lands of Algeria as an extension of its own borders over the next 160 years.

⁷⁴ Abdaslam Ben Kaddour, "The Neo-Makhzan and the Berbers," in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 262–265.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 266.

⁷⁶ Louis-Jean Duclos, "The Berbers and the Rise of Moroccan Nationalism," in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 228–229.

⁷⁷ Kassem, Bahaji, "Morocco's Imazighen (Berbers), the Islamists and the Politics of Religion." *Middle East Studies* 2, no. 4 (2011): 16.

France would declare Algeria as their own territory in 1848.⁷⁸ The indigenous habitants, however, were never held with the same esteem by the French as the land on which they lived.⁷⁹ The French subjugation of any relevant, particular Algerian identity served as a motivation and a point of origin for nationalists beginning in the 1930s. Salafist ulama Shaykh Abdul Hamid Bin Badis led the *ulama* in their creation of a triad Algerian identity consisting of their sovereign land, God (i.e., Allah or Islam more broadly) and Arab brotherhood (and importantly Arabic language). The nationalists transformed the components of this identity into a rallying cry that flew in the face of the assimilationist *evolves* and which left no room for dissension or particularism (i.e., other minority identities).⁸⁰ These views would become increasingly strident and exclusive, nearly stamping out any notions of a specific Kabyle identity during and shortly after the revolution.

Algeria's Amazigh populace was concentrated across three largely inaccessible mountain ranges (i.e., maritime Kabylie in the North, the Djurdjura in the South, and the Agawa ranges between the two)⁸¹; they were the last holdouts against French military forces in the 19th century. Their proximity to the coast, however, eventually brought them into more frequent contact with the occupation forces in the 20th century. For the Kabyle, this proximity gave them distinct advantages through access to the French education system. This meant that most Kabyle were speaking Tamazight and French—not Arabic—it also meant they had more opportunities for education in France itself.⁸² Kabyle access to French educational resources, however, did not translate to empathy for their colonial masters. The Kabyle people would be the source of some of the revolution's fiercest freedom fighters and the heart of the anti-French efforts.

⁷⁸ Farida Abu-Haidar, "Arabisation in Algeria," *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 3 no. 3, (2000): 151.

⁷⁹ Heather J. Sharkey, "Language and Conflict: The Political History of Arabization in Sudan and Algeria," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 12, no.3 (2012): 431.

⁸⁰ Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 114–115.

⁸¹ Collectively called the *Tamurt Idurar* or Land of the Mountains by the Imazighen.

⁸² Willis, "Politics of Berber Identity," 230.

The *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) offered the framework for the Algerian battle for independence. Led by nine key leaders—*les neufs historique*—they all eschewed the assimilationist mentality and asserted that only independence would suffice. While these men were all secular Francophones, their time spent as conscripts in the French army (and in French prisons) solidified their desire for independence in the form of a secular republic.⁸³ The FLN leadership strove to present a uniform non-sectarian message (partially as a response to anti-Kabyle rhetoric from within le Parti du Peuple Algérien [PPA] ranks). Their priority throughout the revolution remained unity above all else—to that end they killed more Algerian civilians than French ones (i.e., 16,000 Algerians versus only 2,700 French).⁸⁴ In reality, much of the revolution was distinctly Kabyle and spearheaded by guerilla fighters from bases in that region. Their military prowess served to inspire the rest of Algeria to come together and fight against France.⁸⁵ While these Amazigh warriors made significant strides against the French in the countryside, their influence in the FLN waned as the urban fronts (an overwhelmingly Arab demographic) consolidated their efforts and dominated the ideology. This meant that despite the Kabyles' military successes, an emerging Arab political identity would dominate the post-war Algerian landscape.

Nowhere was this incongruence more readily apparent than in the fates of several of the FLN's Kabyle leaders throughout the fight for Algerian independence. Kabyle revolutionary Abane Ramdane espoused a demilitarized and secular post-colonial Algeria and was killed by FLN political rivals in 1958. The government arrested and sentenced Hocine Ait Ahmed to death in 1964 for his guerilla war demanding political pluralism (he would escape two years later); President Boumedienne ordered the brutal strangling of

⁸³ Mohammed Hafez, Ph.D., “Anti-Colonial Struggles,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 17, 2012). The four Amazigh leaders were Ait Ahmed Hocine, Abane Ramdane, Belkacem Krim and Mourad Didouche.

⁸⁴ Anna Morath, “Categorical Divides and The Berber Identity Movement: A Discursive Approach to Identity Formation in Algeria and France,” (master’s thesis, University of Leiden, 2012), 36.

⁸⁵ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 54–5,

Ahmed Ben Bella ally Belkacem Krim in his hotel room in 1970.⁸⁶ While their deaths and others in the revolution's leadership were not all outcomes of a direct government effort to politically quiet a Kabyle Amazigh post-war identity (i.e., they were killed for their position and aspirations to power rather than an ethnic identity), they do reveal a deliberate choice by the newly formed government to cling to the newly independent Arab Algerian identity, as well as an inability for Kabyles to assert their role (or their ethnic and linguistic concerns) following independence. By and large they were the political and national losers in the power vacuum left by the retreating French.

The manner in which the Algerian state dealt with these opposition voices is emblematic of a wider and prototypical historical response. That is not to say that its only response has ever been solely repression, assassination and death—while Ait Ahmed's effort did result in his jailing—the government did also bring more Kabyles into the government afterwards in an attempt to quell further rebellion.⁸⁷ While the short-term possibility of recognition or rights for the Kabyle Amazigh was quashed at independence—the substantial émigré population in Paris kept the movement alive—this intellectual diaspora would prove crucial in the last quarter of the century.⁸⁸

The central political voice for the Amazigh populace over the next 30 years (although tolerated only quasi-officially)—the FFS—emerged as a product of Ait Ahmed's evaluation of a parliamentary seat as a distraction to Ben Bella's rapidly growing consolidation of power.⁸⁹ Organizing a grass-roots guerilla resistance in Kabyle he pushed the populace there to abstain from voting for the upcoming referendum and presidential elections with a broad measure of localized success. On 29 September 1963, Ait Ahmed formed the FFS as a counterforce to what he deemed a “fascist

⁸⁶ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 55–56; “Algeria Exile’s Murder Adds Sinister Note,” *Los Angeles Times* November 19, 1970, sec. C; “Algerian Exile found Murdered,” *New York Times*, October 21, 1970; Nigel C. Gibson, “50 Years Later: Fanon’s Legacy,” The Frantz Fanon Blog, last modified December 16, 2011, <http://thinkingafricarhodesuniversity.blogspot.com/2011/12/50-years-later-fanons-legacy.html>.

⁸⁷ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 56.

⁸⁸ Azzedine Layachi, “The Berbers in Algeria: Politicized Ethnicity and Ethnicized Politics,” in *Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies*, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

⁸⁹ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 205.

dictatorship.”⁹⁰ The potency of his resistance efforts, however, was thwarted by the frontier border war with Morocco. Ben Bella was effective in painting Ait Ahmed as unpatriotic and anyone standing against the regime as a possible collaborator with Morocco. In the patriotic rush of fighters to the border to battle against Morocco, the FFS lost its momentum; the widespread arrests of thousands of political dissidents (Ait Ahmed and his lieutenants among them) and staging of troops in Kabyle in 1964 effectively quashed any hopes for the movement in its foreseeable future.⁹¹

For all the nationalist rhetoric decrying France’s assimilationist efforts, it was not without irony that Ben Bella’s 1962 national independence address proclaiming the re-inculcation of an Arab identity and language was delivered in French: “Notre langue nationale, l’arab, va retrouver sa place.”⁹² The inability of the President (a vocal admirer of President Nasser) and his cabinet to converse in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) would become the object of ridicule in many foreign Arab papers as they carried out official visits following independence.⁹³ A few months later, Ben Bella and the National Assembly moved to put an Arabic language policy into place—decreeing that Arabic would be taught at the elementary schools and that it would be systematically promoted with government’s administration.⁹⁴ He did acknowledge, however, that French would continue to be taught due to its prevalence in the study of science and technology.⁹⁵ Tamazight suffered almost immediately at the university level with the removal of the Amazigh studies chair at the University of Algiers occurring in concert with Algerian independence.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, (Bloomington, IN:Indiana University Press: 2005), 201–202.

⁹¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 202.

⁹² Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 154.

⁹³ Ibid., 155.

⁹⁴ Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum: Linguistic Controversy in Post-Colonial Algeria,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32 no. 4 (1996): 269.

⁹⁵ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 154.

⁹⁶ Madeleine Dobie, “Francophone Studies and the Linguistic Diversity of the Maghreb,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 23, no.1 (2003): 34.

The 1964 Charter of Algiers trumpeted Arab-Algerian identity and was a near complete copy of the FLN's 1954 platform.⁹⁷ One of the charter's resolutions “[insisted] on the urgency of emphasizing Arabization in Algeria by: a) acceleration in the teaching of Arabic; b) reinforcement of ties, in particular cultural ties, with the Arab world. . . ; c) increase in the sphere of studies in Arabic at the university level.”⁹⁸ Despite the overt exclusion of Tamazight from the charter as well as other related regime language policies, there was little initial pushback because the slow process of Arabization meant that most Imazighen could still conduct their affairs in French. Ben Bella was also quick to include five Amazigh men in his initial cabinet as an effort to placate activists.⁹⁹

A major obstacle to Arabization efforts within the education system was the dearth of qualified Algerian citizens to teach Arabic. The regime's solution was to import 1000 “teachers” from Egypt, later supplementing them with more educators of questionable background and training from Syria and Iraq. This was a process that would continue into the 1970s. Unfortunately there were no standards or mechanisms to assess or ensure that these primary and secondary school teachers were in fact proficient in Arabic or that they were in fact educators. The outcome of this poorly managed plan was that most of these imported men and women were subpar and unable to properly teach classic Arabic. Further complicating their efforts were the wide-ranging dialectical differences between the various countries that further complicated matters.¹⁰⁰ Aside from the linguistic challenges, many of the Egyptian teachers were also Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members who were active in their attempts to impart their more rigid embodiment of Islam into a largely uneducated and receptive populace.¹⁰¹ At least partial effects of this indoctrination can be seen in the rise of violent extremism decades later (this connection does not mean to equate the MB with violence).

⁹⁷ Morath, “Categorical Divides,” 43.

⁹⁸ Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum,” 269.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 154–155.

¹⁰¹ Sharkey, “Language and Conflict,” 438.

B. MAGHRIB ARABIZATION: HASSAN II (1961–1999) AND BOUMEDIENE, BITAT AND CHADI BENDJEDID (1965–1992)

In addressing Maghrib Arabization, the term *maghrib* itself is indicative of an Arab orientation—the Maghrib countries standing at the western reaches of a line of origin that began in the Arab *mashreq* (i.e., the East). From a macro-historical perspective, of course, Arabization in the Maghrib is not a modern phenomenon—Arabization has been a process that began in concert with the first waves of seventh century Arab invaders and continued organically through the centuries. The formal state institutionalization of *taaroub* (i.e., the process of becoming Arab), however, was a decidedly contemporary creation whose implementation required that both Algeria and Morocco become “modern states.”¹⁰² For most Imazighen, the formalization and state imposition of an Arab identity was not in and of itself a threatening prospect—nearly every citizen (Imazighen included) in both states would primarily self-identify as an Arab to some degree. The threat came from the imposition of Arabic as the sole universal and accepted norm for all communication within the state.

As addressed in previous section, the impetus behind Arabization came from each state’s French colonial experience where access and upward mobility was solely limited to Francophone inhabitants. Both states saw Arabization as the pivotal element by which to right these institutionalized wrongs and legislate a return to their true Arab roots (in Algeria, for instance, Arabic was legally categorized as a foreign language from 1938 to 1961).¹⁰³ For the millions of Tamazight speakers whose Amazigh “roots” predated their Arab ones, this policy would be an affront to their very identity. Decreeing a *de facto*—and increasingly a *de jure*—mandate that all citizens could only be Arab in their ethnic identity and Arabic in their speech superseded what the stated view as assimilation but was tantamount to a spiritual ethnic cleansing for the Imazighen themselves.

¹⁰² Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 117.

¹⁰³ Dobie, “Francophone Studies,” 33–34.

1. Morocco

Following independence, Morocco's Arabization efforts had their greatest effects within the nation's education system. Within this system, the country's youths were taught a narrative that echoed a broader Arab-Islamic one. Its essence asserted that Morocco's history only began when the Arab liberators arrived to free the Imazighen from their backward lives and instilled them with a respect and knowledge of Islam. It further stipulated that Amazigh origins lay in Yemen and that Tamazight was a derivative language of Arabic.¹⁰⁴ Morocco's official historian wrote and predicted that Arabization and a national transportation system would drive out Tamazight within 50 years—leaving only MSA and colloquial Arabic.¹⁰⁵ These sentiments were further amplified by UNFP leader Mohammed Abd al-Jabri who denigrated both *darija* and Tamazight as inferior and incapable of either mobilization or the achievement of broad societal change. Al-Jabri further advocated that Tamazight, in particular, should be stricken from all media as well as the education system.¹⁰⁶

Despite his marriage to an Amazigh woman named Latifa, Hassan II had been merciless as the Crowned Prince in his military response to the rebellions of the Riffian Amazigh after independence.¹⁰⁷ This violence left an indelible mark that would not be officially assuaged until a visit by Hassan II's son, Mohammed VI, nearly half a century later. Unofficially, however, the king would strengthen his relationships with key Amazigh tribes by continuing the traditional monarchic practice of arranging marriages for them with the daughters of key Moroccan families.¹⁰⁸ His ascension as king, however, did allow him to rule in a more active manner than his father (a more passive arbitrator). In particular, this meant that Hassan II was better able to manage and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 119.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 70; Maddy-Weitzman, "Contested Identities," 29.

¹⁰⁸ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The Amazigh factor: state movement relations under Mohammed VI," in *Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (New York: Routledge, 2013), 113.

manipulate the PI whom he viewed as a serious threat to the monarchy's power.¹⁰⁹ A key instrument in lessening the PI threat was his alliance with the Amazigh military power and an easily controlled pro-monarchist MP.

Despite these attempts to consolidate power, the 1970s proved a turbulent era with numerous struggles for power among the historical and military elite. In July 1971, a group primarily made up Imazighen dissatisfied with the continuing influence, power and corruption of controlling Fassi families (not the king himself) hatched an attempted coup that failed. A year later military officers made an attempt to destroy a plane on which the king was embarked. Then, in 1973 an army revolt sprang up in the Middle Atlas. The common thread in the staying ability of Hassan II was his ability to maintain power through the manipulation, control and co-optation of Amazigh officers that remained loyal to him.¹¹⁰

In 1984, the MP was still led by its founder, Mahjoubi Aherdane. Officially, the party still claimed to represent rural Moroccans—most of who were Imazighen.¹¹¹ The chaos and instability of its Algerian neighbor had a profound impact on Hassan II during the 1990s. It forced him to focus on maintaining stability as well as preparing the political and economic landscape for his son to succeed him. While the burgeoning voice of the Amazigh movement proved an important influence during this time period, the movement's salience was dampened at times by the palace's continued machinations in consolidating its domestic and regional power (i.e., its manipulation of opposition voices).¹¹²

In 1991, Aherdane left the MP to start a new opposition party: the Mouvement Nationale Populaire (MNP). The creation of the Arab Maghrib Union a year later marked an important step for the kingdom in its struggle for regional hegemony. It also meant

¹⁰⁹ Coram, "Notes on the Role of the Berbers," 274–276.

¹¹⁰ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 60.

¹¹¹ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Morocco: Brief history of the Berbers Including their Origins and Geographic Location," last modified November 16, 2000, <http://www.refworld.org/>.

¹¹² Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 123.

that Hassan II needed to reassert the Arab character of Morocco—he did this by reinserting the reference to the country as an Arab states after an absence of 30 years.¹¹³

Hassan II's 1994 Throne Day speech came only after a public outcry erupted over the arrest and beating of Amazigh activists by the security forces of his ruthless Minister of Interior Driss Basri.¹¹⁴ After releasing the activists, he declared in his speech that “there is not one of us who cannot be sure that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a small or large amount of cells which came from an origin which speaks one of Morocco’s dialects.”¹¹⁵ He expounded upon this idea by asserting a tri-partite Moroccan identity as one that contains Arab, Amazigh and Sahrawi parts.¹¹⁶ He also made vague promises that Tamazight would be taught in schools. Here again one sees a common pattern of state reaction only amidst threats of public instability. As always, the state creates only the amount or level of concessions required to quell the public anger. In 1996, the king distanced himself from this three-part identity with a *dahir* that forbid the use of Amazigh names on birth certificates.¹¹⁷

It worthwhile to note that there is substantial scientific evidence to support the assertion that most Moroccans have much more than a few genetic Amazigh cells—a very few Arab ones. A scientific study in 2000 examined the genetic markers of Moroccans and compared them to other nearby regions in Europe and the Middle East. Their analysis revealed that the genetic makeup of the majority of Moroccans is Amazigh with little relation to or influence from their seventh century Arab invaders. This fact held true whether examining a Tamazight speaker or an Arabic speaker. Their closest genetic family members are Spaniards, Basques, French, Italians, and Algerians (with Algerians being the closest members). The Algerian and Moroccans today are as distant from Middle Eastern Arabs as they are from Greeks and other Eastern Mediterranean groups.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Bahaji, “Morocco’s Imazighen,” 16.

¹¹⁴ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 31.

¹¹⁵ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 123.

¹¹⁶ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 32.

¹¹⁷ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 33.

¹¹⁸ E. Gomez-Casado et al., “HLA genes in Arabic-speaking Moroccans: close relatedness to Berbers and Iberians,” American Journal of Human Biology 13 no. 1 (2000): 242–243.

2. Algeria

The bulk of the Arabization efforts in Algeria should be viewed as broad efforts at cultural homogenization to counter the colonial French version of history (rather than a targeted vendetta to denigrate Amazigh ethnic and linguistic particularity) that had grown in concert with its divide and rule methodology. This mindset is captured well by the FLN's adoption of the mantra: "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my home" (originally coined in the 1930s by the pre-independence Association of Ulama under the leadership of Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis).¹¹⁹ Of course, President Boumediene's conception of Islam would be one morphed to align with his greater vision of revolutionary socialism. He described Islam as a "revolutionary religion, [one that] has come to liberate man and woman."¹²⁰

It must be noted that in its zeal to cleanse the nation of its French defilement, the government's Arabization policy promoted the classical form of Arabic (as captured in the Qur'an), which few Algerians used in their everyday discourse.¹²¹ The Arabization policy that would continue over the following decades would prompt linguistic scholar Pauline Djité to argue that, "Nowhere else in Africa has the language issue been so central in the fight against colonialism (as in Algeria)." ¹²² Indeed it was the marriage of MSA to the violent Islamists' agenda that would perpetrate such a strong stance in Algeria. In this respect, language policy became an instrument of elite (whether religious or otherwise) control and authority.¹²³

These gradual efforts accelerated after the 1965 revolution in which Boumediene overthrew Ben Bella. As the new president (whose education at the Islamic University of El Azhar, Egypt outweighed his own Amazigh ethnicity) would declare: "Arabization is not only a national and revolutionary necessity, it is also a goal that the Revolution

¹¹⁹ Morath, "Categorical Divides," 15, 25; Kashani-Sabet, "The Swinging Pendulum," 267.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 272.

¹²¹ Abu-Haidar, "Arabisation in Algeria," 154.

¹²² Ibid., 161.

¹²³ Ibid.

must meet, whatever its cost.”¹²⁴ During this time the FLN predicted that their Arabization efforts would be completed by the mid-1980s. The lion’s share of that effort was taken up by the French-educated Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the minister of education, who oversaw the Arabization of the nation’s schools.¹²⁵ Even he, however, expressed doubts as to the likelihood of success for the state’s efforts saying, “Cela ne marchera pas, mais il faut le faire” (i.e., it won’t work, but we must make the effort).¹²⁶ These efforts did, however, see fast success (i.e., almost total Arabization) at the elementary and secondary school level—but the universities remained a greater challenge. This upper level recalcitrance was combated with a national requirement that all professors learn Arabic, as well as through the 1974 creation of *La Société Nationale d’Edition et de Diffusion d’Algérie* (SNED)—a national publishing house devoted to promoting Arabic at the college level and beyond. A few months later, the President would make a speech on the merits of Arabization as a key element in breaking the psychic bondage of the French language:

Arabization, which is an integral part of the preoccupations of this nation and which is guarantor of its national unity, is a strategic option of our socialist revolution . . . We have struggled bitterly, in order to conserve our national personality . . . and in order to safeguard its glory and dignity . . . it is absolutely unjustifiable that we speak and think in a foreign language . . . We have a glorious history. We belong to a secular civilization. It is impossible for us to separate ourselves from it.¹²⁷

Throughout the 1970s, Boumediene banned all Tamazight literature and not only eradicated Amazigh specific courses from the national education system but also created Islamic institutions in areas with concentrated Amazigh populations.¹²⁸ In 1973, the government forced the firing of the Professor of Berber Studies at the University of

¹²⁴ Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum,” 270; Salem Mezhoud, “Glasnost the Algerian Way,” in *North Africa: Nation, State and Region*, ed. George Joffé. (London: Routledge, 1993), 165.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 156.

¹²⁷ Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum,” 272.

¹²⁸ Laueremann, “Amazigh Nationalism,” 43.

Algiers, Mouloud Mammeri and abolished the department itself. Seven years later their cancelation of his conference on Tamazight poetry would set off the “Berber Spring.”¹²⁹

In July 1976, the government published a decree outlining many new policies to include the requirement to change all public notices, street names and town names to Arabic, as well as an instruction for all citizens to turn in their licenses and license plates for Arabic ones. Parents were also forbidden from choosing Tamazight names for their children.¹³⁰ The 1976 Constitution provided a foundation for such policies as it echoed the same calls for a uniform national identity that the FLN had been pushing since before independence.¹³¹ Ultimately, Boumediene’s Arabization efforts (and his own literary MSA fluency) would be roundly applauded following his 1978 official tour throughout the Middle East, leaving large shoes for his successor, Chadi Benjedid to fill the following year.¹³² In December 1979, he decided to rapidly increase the institution of Arabic throughout the education system (i.e., from primary school to the university-level)—a move that would provide much of the tinder for the incendiary “Berber Spring” in 1980.¹³³

During the entire period of Arabization, the government only recognized the existence of an Amazigh identity once—in the preamble of 1986 National Charter.¹³⁴ This blatant disregard came despite his inclusion of five Imazighen on his Revolutionary Council as well as large government expenditures into economic and educational programs of the Aurès and Kabylie regions.¹³⁵ Other systemic political policies started to open up toward the end of the decade. On July 21, 1987 (29 years after Morocco) law 87-15 allowed local non-political associations to form without government

¹²⁹ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 158.

¹³⁰ Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum,” 272; Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 156–157.

¹³¹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 117.

¹³² Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 157.

¹³³ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 118.

¹³⁴ Morath, “Categorical Divdes,” 42; Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 117.

¹³⁵ Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum,” 273.

permission.¹³⁶ This ability for cultural associations to form came nearly three decades after Morocco granted a similar freedom and is emblematic of the overall Algerian government view toward minority groups.¹³⁷ While these groups are grudgingly allowed to exist, they remain closely monitored apolitical organizations.

While Ait Ahmed's long defunct FFS became a legal political party when Benjedid's government opened the political system in 1989, its opposition stance did little to gather support outside the Kabyle region—their efforts were no doubt hampered by three disparate political and cultural efforts (i.e., the FFS, RCD and MCB).¹³⁸ The Algerian civil war erupted after the government quashed certain Islamist victory at the polls by canceling the final round of elections. This autocratic response, coupled with severe unemployment (only four million people employed in a state of twenty-five million at the time) radicalized elements within the Islamist party in a vehemently violent response that would not end for nearly a decade.¹³⁹

The two primary mobilizing groups during this widening of the political system were the various Amazigh associations and the Islamists. Of the two, the latter had superior and broader organization, as well as political heft.¹⁴⁰ This opening only came after widespread demonstrations driven not by ethnic grievances but by rampant poverty, unemployment and economic disparity.¹⁴¹ The government was forced to Islamize their own policies more heavily toward Arabization during this period in an attempt emasculate the warring Islamists and weaken their religious anti-regime rhetoric. This was partially accomplished through the 1989 constitutional revision that once again trumpeted Arabic as the nation's only official language. One concession came through the 4 December 1990 Law 90–31 that enabled non-political associations to operate at the national level. On December, 27, 1990, however, Law 91–05 laid out an 18-month

¹³⁶ Jane Goodman, “Dancing Toward “La Mixité”: Berber Associations and Cultural Change in Algeria.” *Middle East Report* 200, (1996): 17.

¹³⁷ Laueremann, “Amazigh Nationalism,” 44.

¹³⁸ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 205–206

¹³⁹ Sharkey, “Language and Conflict,” 439.

¹⁴⁰ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 204.

¹⁴¹ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 158–159.

deadline, calling for the Arabization of all schools and government administrative offices in that time period. It further delineated a requirement for all university and postgraduate systems to make the same transition by the year 2000. In 1996, this law would be modified to truncate the year 2000 requirement to 1998.¹⁴² A year later the parliament mandated that the education system be fully Arabized within the next two years and the universities within the next seven.

A January 1991 law required that “all educational and administrative establishments, organizations and associations must use only Arabic in all their commercial, financial, technical and artistic dealings” within two years. It further stipulated that only Arabic could be used within the judicial and education and transportation (i.e., highways and signs) system. It also banned the import of any typewriter, computer or piece of office equipment not outfitted with the Arabic alphabet. Finally, it declared any document not in Arabic as invalid.¹⁴³ This was met with widespread protests in Kabyle.

The 1990s witnessed a civic fight against the state (i.e., a struggle for social and economic issues) take on an ethnic framework because of the effectiveness of using linguistic reform (or progress/modernization) as a mobilizer in Kabyle. This approach proved effective to some extent, however, it was stunted by the regime’s ability to frame and denigrate their demands as ethnic ones—an action which only served to motivate and fuel Amazigh radicals (e.g., the MAK). These actions further provoked others, such as Salim Chaker, to realize a need (that previously did not exist) for a specific Amazigh identity apart from an Algerian one, as well as autonomy on some level.

In the fall of 1994, 700,000 students went on strike for six months throughout the Kabyle region. This effort, combined with two other strikes pressured the government into a capitulation of sorts through the creation of the High Commission on Amazighness (HCA).¹⁴⁴ The official mandate of the HCA was to “[rehabilitate] Tamazight [culture] . .

¹⁴² Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 151.

¹⁴³ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 158; Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 120–121.

¹⁴⁴ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 160; Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.

. one of the foundations of the national identity, and the introduction of the Tamazight language in the systems of education and communication.”¹⁴⁵ With the diction itself desultory (i.e., the idea that Amazigh culture needed rehabilitation), the execution followed along the same path—producing no lasting results—only a half-hearted, underfunded attempt at teaching Tamazight to primary school students in a few scattered districts.¹⁴⁶

Any Amazigh efforts took a secondary role, however, to the bloody violence that continued to escalate following Benjedid’s abolishment of the second round elections for fear of dominance (a certainty at that point) by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).¹⁴⁷ While much of FIS’ ire was directed at Francophone and western influence, it did extend to predominantly secular-focused Amazigh activists. Most notably, this was seen in their June 1998 assassination of rebel Amazigh singer-poet and nationalist Lounes Matoub. In this case it was not the state that directly killed or suppressed Amazigh demands, but their limited capacity to preserve the public order allowed the assassination to occur.

In November 1996, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment recognizing Amazigh identity in Algeria but stopped short of recognizing their language.¹⁴⁸ This was done as part of President Zeroual’s strategy to back his rhetoric leading into the 1997 elections. In his speeches he called for the nation to discard notions of particularism (i.e., Islamic, Arab, or Amazigh identities) for the greater good of the Algerian nation. Despite this public pronouncement, his government would continue to push for full Arabization in keeping with the 5 July 1998 deadline.¹⁴⁹ A 1996 law that mandated that government and civil institution affairs (as well as commercial contracts) be conducted in Arabic only was indicative of Zeroual’s true motives.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.

¹⁴⁶ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.

¹⁴⁷ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 159.

¹⁴⁸ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 40.

¹⁴⁹ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 160.

¹⁵⁰ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.

C. MOHAMMED VI (1999-PRESENT) AND ABDELAZIZ BOUTEFLIKA (1999-PRESENT)

1. Morocco

When Mohammed VI took the throne after his father's passing, he was proactive in mending historical injuries, visiting the Rif region early on. This gesture was appreciated and he was welcomed with open arms from the inhabitants there. Following this visit he also invited back exiled Amazigh leader Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi from Cairo.¹⁵¹ These moves served to infuriate the nation's Islamists but this was likely a deliberate calculation by Mohammed VI to manipulate both groups. The 1999 Morocco Educational Charter marked an important step in the Amazigh-state relationship.¹⁵²

Much as his father was influenced by episodes of public unrest in Algeria, the May 2001 Kabyle protests certainly influenced his *dahir* that year. His *dahir* sought primarily to institute the teaching of Tamazight in the classrooms—in most Maghrib states this type of minority language recognition is an uncommon occurrence. Much debate has centered on the *dahir* but it is certainly had a marked impact on the Amazigh movement. The Amazigh naysayers viewed the proclamation as an empty promise and an attempt to coopt their movement while its supporters viewed it as a long-awaited shift toward government recognition. Despite their differences in viewpoints, the *dahir* has raised the public profile of Tamazight and acted as a tool for both state and sub-state actors. The political and economic largesse of the Moroccan state (i.e., the *makhzen*) has the ability to affect and influence any movement within its borders.¹⁵³ Finally, many were concerned that the king's educational concessions could end up as a de facto “separate and unequal” policy that would serve to further deprive rural Amazigh of any chance for upward mobility by teaching them a language that is useless and unusable within the public and administrative job sector.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 35–36.

¹⁵² L’aménagement Linguistique dans le Monde, “Morocco: 1999 Charte Nationale d’éducation et de formation,” last accessed 10 May, 2013, <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/AXL/afrique/maroc-charte-educ.htm>.

¹⁵³ David Crawford, “Royal Interest in Local Culture: Amazigh Identity and the Moroccan State,” in *Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies*, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

¹⁵⁴ Crawford, “Royal Interest,” 188.

On 17 October 2001, Mohammed VI officially established the IRCAM and endowed it with a \$100 million annual budget. This state action created a split within the Amazigh movement with some viewing it as a pivotal step forward and others seeing it as just another in a series of attempts by the monarchy to co-opt opposition voices. The Amazigh opposition voices saw a state-sponsored entity as giving the *makhzen* too much freedom and relegating a dynamic cultural movement into a static institutionalized one much akin to that of folklore. They further charged that it focused the movement on education and linguistic standardization instead of the larger political reforms needed.¹⁵⁵ The movement's split eventually radicalized some of these dissenting voices within the movements, pushing them to extreme political positions (for an Arab-Islamic country) such as supporting the U. S. invasion of Iraq (viewing it as a strike against Arab-Islamic repression) and even supporting Israel.¹⁵⁶ These extremists would mock ICRAM, likening it to its near homophone word in the *tashelhit* dialect for filth, *ircan*.¹⁵⁷

The following year the king made another move indicative of a liberalizing political system when he amended his grandfather's 1958 *dahir* by delineating that only a court could dissolve a cultural association. The change also created a 60-day deadline for the provincial government to acknowledge the formation of an association or changes to its membership or statutes (i.e., Law 75–00).¹⁵⁸ Failure to provide a provisional receipt was deemed as an acceptable permit to continue operations. Practically, though, this *dahir* has little effect throughout the state. Local authorities continue to ignore submitted

¹⁵⁵ Graham H. Cornwell and Mona Atia, "Imaginative Geographies of Amazigh Activism in Morocco." *Social & Cultural Geography* 13 no.3 (2012): 268.

¹⁵⁶ Silverstein and Crawford, "Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State," *MER: Middle East Report* 233 (2004), 47.

¹⁵⁷ Silverstein and Crawford, "Amazigh Activism." More information on the association 2001 constitutional changes elevating Tamazight status can be found at the following link: <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/AXL/Langues/CONSTITUTIONS-pays-M.htm#Maroc>. The full text of the "IRCAM *dahir*" can be found here: <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/AXL/afrique/maroc-dahir2001.htm>.

¹⁵⁸ Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, "Freedom of Association in the Euro-Mediterranean Region," last accessed May 10, 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/FAssociation/Responses2012/other_contributions/World-EMHRN2009_Annual_Report_on_Free_Association.pdf, 9.

paperwork, thereby preventing select groups from opening an applicable bank accounts and stymieing attempts to rent office and convention space.¹⁵⁹

In 2004, the government finally initiated Tamazight language education within some rural schools—the policy output of his 2001 *dahir* but a move still viewed by many as action that would further entrench an already deprived and disconnected rural lower class in poverty and widen the urban-rural gap.¹⁶⁰

With the flames of the Arab Spring ablaze throughout the region, the king made a speech on 9 March 2011 recognizing Tamazight as an official national language and Amazigh as part of the Moroccan identity. This recognition of Tamazight, however, was still enacted in deference to Arabic. Furthermore, the constitution's reference to Tamazight as an official language of the state, still failed to raise it on par with Arabic (it also does not break out the different Tamazight dialects). More importantly the constitutional changes fail to expound on, or offer guidance on the implications and implementation of Tamazight as an official language. These practical implications include whether or not all government institutions (to include its foreign embassies) will be required to be bilingual (i.e., Arabic and Tamazight) and the delineation of a clear timeline for lingual implementation.¹⁶¹

2. Algeria

When Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in 1999, he indicated that 21st century Algeria would pursue a new multicultural and multilingual direction, declaring Algeria's background to be an Islamic, Arab, and Amazigh one.¹⁶² A few months later, the armed branch of the FIS announced a cessation of its near decade-long violent campaign against the regime—Bouteflika reciprocated by granting amnesty to the surrendering forces.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 53–54.

¹⁶⁰ Silverstein and Crawford, “Amazigh Activism,” 47–48.

¹⁶¹ Ibn Kafka, “Du Statut Juridique Des Langues Berbères et Etrangères en Droit Marocain,” *Ibn Kafka Obiter Dicta*, April 15, 2008, <http://ibnkafkasobiterdicta.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/du-statut-juridique-des-langues-berberes-et-etrangères-en-droit-marocain/>; L’aménagement Linguistique dans le Monde, “Maroc,” last accessed 10 May, 2013, <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/AXL/afrique/maroc.htm>.

¹⁶² Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 162.

Over the last decade, the Algerian government has not employed any blatant social or economic discrimination specifically at any of its citizens for their Amazigh ethnicity. Thus, the mobilizing force is rarely an ethnic one or a common identity but rather an antipathy for the regime itself.¹⁶³ This societal animosity (especially prevalent in Kabylie) grew from the ruling elites chasmic disregard for the plight and needs of its citizens. The term “la hogra” became popular as way to describe the alienation and humiliation caused by government negligence.¹⁶⁴ The word “hogra” itself has no direct translation but the slang word continues to be salient today—used by both specific groups (to express their frustration at exclusion from the decision-making processes) and by the general populace (to describe the static downtrodden malaise in which the average Algerian exists).¹⁶⁵

In the spring of 2001, this societal estrangement produced the “Black Spring” (*Tafsut Taberkant*)—a period of discontent and protest that lasted well into the summer and spread outside of Kabyle. This prolonged airing of grievances brought a violent overreaction from the government security forces who employed torture, brutality and summary executions that totaled in excess of 100 deaths.¹⁶⁶ The government would later attempt to atone for its violence with an 8 May 2002 Algeria constitutional amendment recognizing Tamazight as a “national” language but not an official one. This half-hearted compromise fell in line with the President’s continued resolve as to the Arab nature of the state, expounding on this sentiment in a 2005 speech: “Arabic will remain the only official language in Algeria.”¹⁶⁷ His speech continued by mocking Amazigh aspirations for Tamazight equality, claiming that no other country in the world has two official languages.¹⁶⁸ This statement ignored, of course, the laws and governments of Switzerland, Canada and Belgium (all which have multiple recognized official languages).

¹⁶³ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 2006.

¹⁶⁴ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 122.

¹⁶⁵ Amel Blidi, “‘La Hogra’, ou la galere au quotidien,” *Courrier International*, June 21, 2012, <http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2012/06/21/la-hogra-ou-la-galere-au-quotidien>.

¹⁶⁶ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 122.

¹⁶⁷ “Bouteflika Ebranle la Kabylie,” *Souss.com*, October 6, 2005, <http://www.souss.com/bouteflika-ebranle-la-kabylie/>.

¹⁶⁸ This statement also displayed his ignorance of Switzerland, Canada and Belgium which all have multiple recognized official languages.

The continued inefficacy of the FFS in representing Amazigh demands (the same can be said for the Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LADDH)) prompted the formation of the *aarouch* movement (later morphing into the Citizen’s Movement).¹⁶⁹ The state’s ability to neutralize the political party system as a method for mobilization and representation proved effective as they then had only to outlast the poorly organized *aarouch* movement (this occurred in 2007). With its demise, the government has since been able to make only minor concessions in Kabyle at the expense and exclusion of the rest of the country’s Tamazight-speaking areas. By effectively isolating the “Amazigh question” to one region they weaken the movement’s appeal and also contain its mobilization efforts.¹⁷⁰

The government’s focus continues to ignore any acknowledgement of ethnicity apart from an Arab one and instead responds only to specific actors (i.e., elite and external states) and beliefs (i.e., Socialism, secularism and Islamism).¹⁷¹ This has shielded any momentum from the region’s Arab Spring from producing a tangible outcome for Algeria’s Imazighen. A corporate weariness from the decade-long civil war continues to dampen the prospect for any effective mass mobilization or protests. The protests that did occur in Algiers calling for political change were led by the nationally-focused but largely powerless RCD.¹⁷² Despite the failure of the movement to effectively mobilize, the gap between the regime and its Kabyle citizens, in particular, continues to widen. Animosity between the aggressive and intrusive state security apparatus and the Kabyle political parties is approaching a boiling point if the regime does not change. Kabyle citizens point to a pattern of targeted government neglect witnessed during the harsh 2012 blizzards. Cut off from the country’s transportation network and social services for weeks, the populace there was left to fend for itself.¹⁷³ Faced with looming local challenges such as basic economic subsistence and a lack of

¹⁶⁹ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 59.

¹⁷⁰ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 123.

¹⁷¹ Crawford, “Royal Interest,” 186.

¹⁷² Willis, “Politics and Power,” 229.

¹⁷³ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 133–134.

social services, the Kabyle parties are unlikely to effectively mobilize their populace for calls of linguistic and ethnic parity at the national level.

D. CONCLUSION

Globalization and the ubiquity of mobile smart phones has limited the ways in which even an authoritarian state can respond to its minority ethnic groups, irrespective of their mobilization tactics. Many methods, however, while not violent can still have devastating effects on population groups—whether concrete or psychic. These included exclusion from the political process, as well as more systemic exclusion from basic services by refusing to recognize a language spoken by millions.

In each nation, the seat of the president and king represented the ultimate institutional power. As near omnipotent executors of public policy, these men were products of their times and chose the manner and priority by which the state would respond to Amazigh aspirations. The regimes of both Mohammed V and Ben Bella reflected a fervent nationalism that had to be bridled and guided once independence was won. This process placed a priority on demonstrating and consolidated the reach and power of nation’s leadership and relegated minority identities to an afterthought. This nationalism was later replaced by building decades of Arabization under Morocco’s Hassan II and a trio of presidents in Algeria. During Arabization, the leaders systematically and gradually constructed institutional barriers to the Amazigh and Tamazight particularity. These barriers (i.e., language policies) carried both intended and unintended consequences for the Imazighen. The largest challenges facing Mohammed VI and Bouteflika at the turn of the century was the changing nature of the global and national political order. Politics (and associated conflict) were no longer local, or even national. An increasingly mobilized and vocal Amazigh movement forced both states to address its concerns. These concerns, however, were taken in turn with respect to the rising superior power and mobility of the Islamists political forces.

Throughout each of these key periods, however, Morocco and Algeria reacted uniquely to Amazigh grievances. Concessions came only as a means to retain and/or consolidate power. Morocco proved more effective in tempering the salience and

militancy of the movement through consistent cooptation. Whereas Algeria, by contrast, favored repression and exclusion over the recognition of a unique Amazigh identity within its borders. By and large, Algeria's economic largesse (and accompanying freedom from aid and assistance) enable it to better slough off the concerns of the international community after their trademark overzealous response to protests. Morocco, on the other hand, was forced to be far more deliberate in its response—carefully (and vocally) framing cooptation under the guise of benevolent concessions.

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III. NATURE OF THE AMAZIGH MOVEMENTS

This chapter addresses the nature and path of Amazigh movements themselves as a contributing influence to the outcomes achieved. It is divided into three parts—the historical Amazigh, the independence Amazigh, and the modern Amazigh (i.e., the Amazigh within the context of identity politics and globalization). In analyzing the arc of the movements in both countries, it is readily apparent that the movements are secondary and minor actors—the state institutions are undoubtedly the greatest influencers. Movements exist very much under the shadow of the authoritarian state—forced to walk a common and fine line—between protest and subservience to established normative opposition behavior. The movements in the two states, however, took very different paths shaped by the state behavior. The co-optive behavior of Morocco’s regime funneled its Amazigh movement toward a milder path. Algeria’s default repressive response, by contrast, channeled its opposition Amazigh constituents toward much more radical behavior.

While many leaders and Arab scholars within the Moroccan and Algerian state have argued that the Amazigh identity and self-awareness is an artificial and modern creation, most in the Amazigh movements argue for a primordial identity birthed thousands of years ago as original inhabitants of North Africa.¹⁷⁴ The role and function of this historical Amazigh within both states’ history is then a relatively new acknowledgement but one whose study is fundamental to the legitimacy of the movement today. The independence Amazigh was a more a victim of the race to fill the power vacuum left by France’s retreat/exit than deliberate targeted subjugation aimed at their movement or ethnicity. That said, the post-independence struggle in Algeria was much more sanguine and contested. The modern Amazigh is divided into two main periods—the movement that emerged with the rise of identity politics in the 1970s and its ensuing maturation at the close and dawn of the new century. In Morocco, this movement bloomed in the context of multiculturalism and a heightened societal recognition. A

¹⁷⁴ Mohammed Chafik, in particular, makes a forceful argument to this end in the 2004 translation of his seminal work *A Brief Survey of Thirty-Three Centuries of Amazigh History*.

darker undercurrent ran through the movement's narrative in Algeria during the violence and bloodshed surrounded the highly publicized Berber Spring and its later derivations. Finally, the idea of a pan-Amazigh movement must be addressed despite its lack of serious traction at this point. With the instantaneous flow of news and communication enabled through the ubiquitous presence of mobile smartphones, some iteration of the global Amazigh is sure to evolve.

For the movements in both states, the notion that the geographic location and concentration of their constituents (i.e., its Amazigh inhabitants) could further explain each movement's potency or weakness at different points in history appears to be an easily verified relationship. One could then use this relationship to explore voting behavior and the degree of correlation with economic data. This relationship could also pinpoint specific government repression or exclusion. In most developed liberal democracies this would be true. The ability to conduct such analysis, of course, hinges on population and demographic data (i.e., census data) being available, comprehensive and reliable.

In Morocco's case their last census was in 2003–4 and on it there was no option for the citizen to state that they speak Tamazight as a primary, secondary or tertiary language. There was also no option to designate one's ethnicity (this is the standard for nearly all Arab-Islamic countries, to include Algeria). Instead a researcher attempting to correlate ethnic or language data with patterns of voting behavior is left to imprecise guesswork and unverifiable assessments.¹⁷⁵ Even the oft-touted percentages of Tamazight speakers (whether by international organizations or the states themselves) are largely guesswork). The states are able to use the census as also a political tool to limit the salience or potency of self-identified Imazighen (or more specifically Tamazight speakers) within the political system.¹⁷⁶ If Amazigh groups had this data, they could then make a more powerful argument for grievances of economic repression, exclusion or inequality. The flip-side to this point, though, is (as Benedict Anderson points out in

¹⁷⁵ Lauermann, "Amazigh Nationalism," 50–51. In this journal article, Lauermann makes a valiant effort to correlate Tamazight-speaking Amazigh populations in Morocco's various regions with political party association (e.g., PI or MP support) but it falls flat (as he obliquely admits) for this very reason.

¹⁷⁶ Bahaji, "Morocco's Imazighen," 8.

Chapter Ten of *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*) that states can also use census data to create an artificial classification within their population. They can then use it to systematically target and exclude or expel (either by force or by “choice”) specific groups within their borders (e.g., the notorious Bhutan census that resulted in the expulsion of more than 100,000 citizens of Nepalese ethnicity).¹⁷⁷

| Dialect Group | Estimated Population | Location |
|---------------|----------------------|--|
| Tamazight | 3,150,000 | Middle and High Atlas Mountains, Central Morocco |
| Kabylie | 3,123,000 | Grand Kabylie Mountains, Northern Algeria |
| Tachelhit | 3,000,000 | Southwestern Morocco |
| Tarifit | 1,700,000 | Rif Mountains, Northern Morocco |
| Tachawit | 1,400,000 | Aurès Mountains, Northeast Algeria |
| Tamajaq | 640,000 | Central Niger |

Figure 3. Major Tamazight Dialects (After Lauermann, 2009)

In Morocco there are three overall geographic Amazigh groups (i.e., the Beraber Tamazight-speakers [in the Middle and High Atlas mountains], the Chleuh Tachelhit-speakers [in the Southwestern Souss valley region], and the Rif Tarifit-speakers [in the Rif mountains of the North]). With most of their population secluded in largely inaccessible mountain ranges that are far from the urban political centers, the movement struggles to build and form a cohesive voice and to capitalize on their numbers.

In Algeria there are four main geographic Amazigh groups (i.e., the Qbayil [Kabyle in the North], the Shawiyya [in the East], the Mazab [in the Northern Sahara]

¹⁷⁷ Tristan Mabry, Ph.D., “Expulsion,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 2, 2012).

and the Tuareg [in the deserts of far South]). For Algeria, though, the tradition of recalcitrance and defiance has always emanated from Kabyle (supported intellectually from diaspora in France). There are two main Tamazight dialects with several smaller ones spoken throughout the country: Taqbaylit (5 million in Kabylie), Chaoui (2 million in the Shawiyya/Aurès region), and Tamzabit, Znati, Tachenouit, Tamesheq (throughout the country in 1–200, 000 person pockets).¹⁷⁸

It is only in the Kabyle region that this idea of geographic contiguity may be a factor of any real influence—ethnic consciousness (i.e., the awareness of a “set of beliefs, myths and cultural traits...that combine to establish a unique connectedness between people who identify themselves as [Imazighen]”) is considerably weaker in Algeria’s other three Amazigh regions.¹⁷⁹ This ethnic awareness and identity, however, has not built into an ethnic nationalism.

Of paramount importance is that neither movement has had census modification as a platform consideration. In Morocco this has been prevented by the king’s “we are all Berber’s decree”—while Mohammed VI’s proclamation may appear to be an altruistic one, it is not without ulterior motives—mainly the insulation of the government from charges of minority discrimination (after all, if every Moroccan is also Amazigh then the government could hardly be discriminatory against an entire population).

¹⁷⁸ Morath, “Categorical Divides,” 5.

¹⁷⁹ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 210, 213.




Figure 4. Map of spoken languages (From *Ethnologue*, 2012)

A. THE HISTORICAL IMAZIGHEN

The details of Amazigh history themselves that extend back centuries have only limited relevance to this thesis which focuses on state-movement interactions and outcomes. They are worth addressing in a cursory manner, though, because the study and analysis of them distinct from a monolithic Arab-Islamic history is a modern phenomenon and a critical part of the emerging Amazigh identity that espouses an ancient narrative and primordial connection amongst its members.¹⁸⁰ Prior to the 1970s, there was no scholarship or recognition of the Amazigh within the broader narrative history of Algeria or Morocco. To the contrary, Arab nationalists belittled such ideas as colonial contrivances created to weaken independence efforts. The national narrative in both countries largely portrayed the Imazighen as savages and the invading Arabs as righteous saviors who came proffering salvation and civilization. The only minor exception to this was in Morocco where the 11th to 14th century ruling dynasties were Amazigh ones (e.g., the Almohades from 1130–1269).¹⁸¹ Indeed much of their history has had to be “imagined”¹⁸² since its history has largely been an oral one and because it had also been suppressed by more than a millennium of Arab-Islamic rule. There is then an inherent tension between movement proponents that seek to amalgamate this unique corporate memory and history that stands apart from the Arab-Islamic one and those that point out that it was the standardization of Arabic in *Tamazgha* that gave the Imazighen the ability to collect this history through the written word.¹⁸³

This is not to say there has been no historical scholarship about the Amazigh people. In the 10th century, King Bourghwata translated the Qu’ran into Tamazight, however, these translations were destroyed following the king’s defeat by Sunnis

¹⁸⁰ Nisan, *Minorities*, 54. It is appropriate then that the word used to describe the extended Amazigh family group is *vein*—as it denotes an organic and natural connection through blood.

¹⁸¹ Maddy-Weitzman, *Magrib*, 51–52; Shana Cohen and Larabi Jaidi, *Morocco: Globalization and Its Consequences*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 93.

¹⁸² In this case, “imagined” is used not in the pejorative sense but is used instead to describe the idea that their history had to be largely created and constructed from a corporate memory versus an evaluation of ancient texts.

¹⁸³ Maddy-Weitzman, *Maghrib*, 54–55.

invaders.¹⁸⁴ In the fourteenth century, Tunisian scholar Ibn Khaldun wrote extensively about the history of the world and man in his ambitious *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. In this first volume he lays the foundation for a scientific approach to history, later dedicating the sixth volume to the history of the Imazighen. In his first volume, he recognizes the Imazighen role as original inhabitants and proprietors of North Africa, a group distinct from the conquering Arab forces: “since time immemorial, this human race—the Berbers—has populated the plains, the mountains, the plateau, the countryside and the towns of the Maghreb.”¹⁸⁵ He describes a common Amazigh identity, attributing to them particular “group feelings” and “common descent” that have always resisted urbanization and clung to a nomadic desert existence.¹⁸⁶ He further lauds their resistance and resilience against centuries long efforts by Arab dynasties at subjugation.¹⁸⁷ Despite notions of group identity 600 years ago, it was not until the imposition of state Arabization policies that the movement galvanized in a modern sense.¹⁸⁸

As original inhabitants of North Africa, the Imazighen had long resisted external rule—fighting off the Romans, Vandals and Byzantines before gradually succumbing to invading Arab forces in the 7th century who used Islam as a unifying, and ultimately, a conquering device. Diaspora activists and intellectuals today cite the emergence of the Amazigh in world history as “Year One,” 943 BCE, when Libico-Amazigh Meshwesh tribal leader Sheshonk I began the “Libyan Dynasties” in Egypt. Their presence continued to a powerful one, captured in the heroic tales of second and third century BCE Amazigh Hellenic kingdom leaders like Jurgurtha who fought bravely (but unsuccessfully) against eventual Roman rule. Some descendants of these conquered Imazighen would emerge in the coming centuries as notable figures and thinkers, to include Septimus Severus—the first native African Roman Emperor who ruled in the 2nd

¹⁸⁴ Bahaji, “Morocco’s Imazighen,” 26.

¹⁸⁵ Masin, “Rejoinez nous” Tamazgha. www.tamazgha.fr/north-african-berbers-and-kabylia.html.

¹⁸⁶ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History*, ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University ,1981) 270; Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, 1958, 266–267.

¹⁸⁷ Khaldun, *Muqaddimah* 1981, 131.

¹⁸⁸ David Crawford and Katherine E. Hoffman, “Essentially Amazigh: Urban Berbers and the Global Village,” in *The Arab African and Islamic World: Interdisciplinary Studies*, ed. Ralph M. Coury and R. Kevin Lacey (New York:Peter Lang Publishing, 2000), 123.

and 3rd centuries. Finally, they point out that even Christianity shares the roots of its church with the Imazighen—fourth century church father Saint Augustine’s mother herself was an Amazigh.¹⁸⁹

The gradual centuries long Arab envelopment was not without compromises or setbacks from both sides. This tension is evident in one hadith that characterizes Imazighen as possessors of 69 of the 70 parts of wickedness.¹⁹⁰ Ibn Khaldun reports that the Amazigh in the Maghrib revolted against their Islamic overlords no less than 12 times before finally embracing the religion and rule.¹⁹¹ Chief among these resistors was the heralded Amazigh queen known as Kahina who battled the Arab marauders during their initial century of invasion.¹⁹² While nearly all Amazigh people today embrace Islam as a part of their identity in a general sense, they practice it particularly, tending toward Sufism with an emphasis on the importance of *marabouts* and the veneration of saints and ancestors. Most Amazigh women enjoy more independence and freedom than their Arab counterparts as well—evidence of this seen in their traditional carnal *hedra* dance.¹⁹³

In the centuries following the Arab conquest both Morocco and Algeria came under the rule of several Islamic Amazigh dynasties.¹⁹⁴ During the 11th to the 14th centuries, the Almoravids, the Almohads and the Marinids all ruled as Amazigh Islamic dynasties.¹⁹⁵ The last Amazigh empire in Morocco came to an end in 1279.¹⁹⁶

A common historical criticism by opponents of the Tamazight language is that it is incompatible with the Islam and has no place in Islam’s history. There is, however,

¹⁸⁹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 112.

¹⁹⁰ Nisan, *Minorities*, 2nd ed., 55–57. In this passage he recounts a *hadith* possible attributed to the Prophet Muhammed that states, “There are seventy parts of wickedness. The Berbers have sixty-nine, and mankind and the Jinns have one.”

¹⁹¹ Khaldun, *Muqadimmah*, 1958. 332–333.

¹⁹² Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 112–113.

¹⁹³ Nisan, *Minorities*, 2nd. ed., 55–57.

¹⁹⁴ Laueremann, “Amazigh Nationalism,” 44–45.

¹⁹⁵ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 113.

¹⁹⁶ Nisan, *Minorities*, 2nd ed., 60.

credible research demonstrating that Tamazight has long been used in Moroccan governance, as well as Islamic worship and ceremonies. Furthermore, there is jurisprudence written in Tamazight (*fikh*) during a long period of the nation's history. One notable example is that of Almoravid leader Yussef Ibn Tashfin, a man unable to speak Arabic, but still able to operate and execute his office as "commander of the faithful" speaking only in Tamazight¹⁹⁷

As the 20th century began, the Imazighen possessed all the elements of nationhood with the exception of a common codified language.¹⁹⁸ In Morocco, poetry from the 1914–18 Ait Ndir region reveals that the Imazighen felt a solidarity with the *makhzen* and viewed the French—the 'Christians' as invaders: O red city! O Dar Debbibagh! The Makhzan is no more!/The Christians strut about there with total impunity/Cry for the fates of our cities: Fes, Meknes, Agourai, Sefrou and Tabadout!/Surely the Christians are the cause of our fall!¹⁹⁹

The French 1930 "Berber *dahir*" marks an important point in the movement's history and has been misused by both sides.²⁰⁰ The 1939 publication of Algerian Amazigh poet and writer Jean Amrouche's *Chants Berbères de Kabylie* signaled the emergence of Amazigh identity but only as one specific to their region—not the state at large. It was an important countercurrent to the homogenous nationalism movement, though, and signaled an important transition from low to high culture for the Algerian Imazighen movement.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Bahaji, "Morocco's Imazighen," 12–13.

¹⁹⁸ Nisan, *Minorities*, 2nd ed., 61.

¹⁹⁹ Wyrtzen, "Colonial State Building," 236–237.

²⁰⁰ L'aménagement Linguistique dans le Monde, "1930 Maroc Dahir;," last accessed 10 May, 2013, <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/AXL/afrique/maroc-dahir1930.htm>.

²⁰¹ Morath, "Categorical Divides," 26.

B. THE INDEPENDENCE (TRIBAL) AMAZIGH

1. Morocco.

At independence, any advocates for Amazigh rights and recognition restrained the fervency of their cries in deference to the greater prevailing nationalist forces. As discussed in the previous chapter, the king originally created the MP to cement his relationship with powerful leaders in the rural countryside (where the majority of the population lived at independence). Despite this ignominious origin, it has long enjoyed substantial Amazigh support. Aside from a pro-monarchy focus, its original platform in the years prior to its official formation called for the government to recognize Tamazight as an official language and to increase the power wielded by the Amazigh tribal councils.²⁰² This platform amounted to hollow rhetoric in the years following, however, with MP a member of the 1965 royalist coalition government that passed the Arabization law that year.²⁰³

Amazigh support, however, did not rest solely in the MP. The left-leaning UNFP (a breakaway party from the PI) pulled in the support of many younger Amazigh urban workers and intellectuals. They felt that with a socialist vision for Morocco's future, they could combat the established entrenchment of the powerful and rich Fassis families and cast off the tribal constraints of their Amazigh heritage. Intellectually this also implied the demise of the monarchy, however, in practice their opposition stance usually defaulted to support of the king.²⁰⁴ The UNFP also pulled in the support of southern Amazigh businessmen (i.e., the Shleuh)—not for any ideological reasons—but due to their interests in besting competitor Fassis families and businesses.²⁰⁵

The main thrust of Amazigh effort during this time period emanated from the role of the Amazigh tribal sheikhs who relished and amplified their power due to their

²⁰² Laueremann, "Amazigh Nationalism," 41.

²⁰³ Willis, "Politics and Power," 212.

²⁰⁴ Octave Marais, "The Political Evolution of the Berbers in Independent Morocco," in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 282–283.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 282.

relationship with the king. Their focus was (understandably) on maintaining power and stature in competition with powerful Fassis and urban bourgeoisie.²⁰⁶ In the decade following independence, that the executive seat would be filled by a king was not a given. The absolute power he enjoys today comes only as a product of decades of constant manipulation and careful alliance building after independence.²⁰⁷

The king's 1958 *dahir* allowing for the freedom of association (meant to speed up MP formation) enabled a substantial rise in the number of cultural associations in following decades, especially those dedicated to promoting awareness of the Amazigh identity and its rightful place in the nation's history.²⁰⁸ The sole tangible activist byproduct in the 1960s came in 1967 when Imazighen, weary of the secular left-wing's growing promotion of a uniform pan-Arab identity, founded the Moroccan Association of Research and Cultural Exchange (AMREC) in Rabat. Notable and indicative of a reticence to place any outward emphasis of a distinct Amazigh identity was the conspicuous absence of any Amazigh terminology in the cultural association's name.²⁰⁹

2. Algeria.

At independence in Algeria, Amazigh freedom fighters in the FLN (largely from Kabyle and Aurès) struggled for a voice and place amidst an urban Arab nationalist-controlled government with little patience for dissenting views or identities. As discussed in the previous chapter, many key Amazigh figures (those that survived the war against the French) would meet murderous ends in the years following independence. Ben Bella's recruitment of numerous Amazigh notables into the ruling leadership temporarily stifled any opposition voices and also placated the constituents under these leaders (Amazigh held five of the nineteen ministerial positions in Ben Bella's first

²⁰⁶ Nisan, "Minorities," 1st ed., 272.

²⁰⁷ Michael Willis, "Politics and Power," 211–212.

²⁰⁸ Laueremann, "Amazigh Nationalism," 41.

²⁰⁹ Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 120.

government).²¹⁰ Soon growing disillusioned with Ben Bella's leadership, Ait Ahmed formed the FFS and would lead Kabyle guerilla forces against the government. From 1962–63 these Kabyle Imazighen revolted against the FLN, angered by their maltreatment after fighting so valiantly during the revolution.²¹¹ Despite their military prowess, these efforts were far outmatched by the political prowess of Ben Bella and his sycophants. The FFS actions were further hampered by the opposition of half of National Assembly's Kabyle deputies who issued a declaration that "there is no Kabyle problem; Kayblia is a region like any other in the country."²¹² This defeat led to the FFS's abolishment and left no party to represent the specific needs of the Imazighen. In two later iterations, Ben Bella would keep only three Amazigh in ministerial positions.²¹³ After Boumediene's 1965 coup, he would take a more pragmatic approach, appointing five Imazighen to the Revolutionary Council (twenty percent being the Amazigh population proportion by his calculation). He would also attempt to quell Amazigh opposition through investment in the economic infrastructure of Kabye and Aurès. These efforts coupled with French remaining the lingua franca within the government (and a language spoken most fluently and widely by the Kabyles), provided very little impetus for anyone to risk imprisonment or censure by mobilizing or protesting.²¹⁴ The incentives would change, however, at the close of the 1960s with the acceleration of Arabization policies in Algeria.

In 1967 the Berber Academy was created in Paris and was renamed two years later as the Berber Academy Agraw Imazighen. It was—and would remain—an organization dominated by a largely diaspora elite. This Academy would be instrumental in encouraging the rapid growth of Amazigh cultural groups in Paris beginning in the late 1960s. During this time period the Berber Studies Group (GEB) also emerged with a

²¹⁰ William B. Quandt, "The Berbers in the Algerian Political Elite," in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 294–295.

²¹¹ Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 117.

²¹² Quandt, "The Berbers in the Algerian Political Elite," 296.

²¹³ Ibid., 299.

²¹⁴ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 272.

largely cultural (vice political) agenda. The MCB also emerged in 1968 advocating for a multi-cultural Algeria—they would grow to be the most important opposition voice within the Algeria before the rise of Islamist power.²¹⁵

C. THE MODERN AMAZIGH: THE AMAZIGH IDENTITY MOVEMENT

1. 1970s and Globalization

The rise of identity politics in the 1970s marked the political instrumentalization of ethnic culture at large. On both sides of the debate, the rise of ethnic nationalism in the international arena by formerly ignored minority groups produced a steep learning curve for those in power that would collide frequently with sweeping Arabization policies in the coming decades.²¹⁶

In Algeria, economic conditions drove large numbers of the residents from the mountains of Kabyle to the urban centers. Ideologically, this rural to urban migration joined a poor rural populace with an intellectual Kabyle elite resulting in a growing realization of ethnic identity. Practically this movement enabled a more fluid social ladder and drove an increase in Kabyle emigration (46% of all Algerians abroad by 1980 came from Kabyle).²¹⁷ This emigration in turn created a European Amazigh diaspora that formed the ideological and intellectual backbone for the movement.

During this time period, “Vive la Kabylie” emerged as a symbol of this growing ethnic consciousness in the midst of a country’s economic largesse was so unequally distributed. Other central social figures rising in popularity were poet and scholar Mouloud Mammeri and poet and author Kateb Yacine.²¹⁸ Yacine fought to counter the government-sponsored narrative of Algeria’s history and identity as solely an Arab-Islamic one. Prevalent among the growing blooming of Amazigh culture was the

²¹⁵ Morath, “Categorical Divides,” 44; Mezhoud, “Glasnost the Algerian Way,” 144–145.

²¹⁶ Cohen and Jaidi, “Morocco,” 92.

²¹⁷ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 56–57.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 57.

impressive “New Kabyle Song” occurrence.²¹⁹ Other key events include the 1973 publication of the first Amazigh bulletin by the University of Paris VIII GEB.

A portion of Morocco’s Berber/Amazigh Manifesto would capture much of the movements’ sentiment in both countries regarding their rejection of Arabic as the only language that should be able to operate within the broader Islamic context. They point to the words of the rightly-guided Caliph (and son-in-law to the prophet Muhammed) Ali and his encouragement to embrace languages other than Arabic:

A person is “Arab” or “non-Arab” by his language. As for the Imâm Ali (may Allah honor him), he urged the Arabs to learn languages because their knowledge increases intelligence and the ability to apprehend human characters. He said: “Learn languages! Each language represents a human-being!”²²⁰




Figure 5. Arab-Berber Ethnic Map (After Leclerc, 2006).

²¹⁹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 118.

²²⁰“The Berber Manifesto,” *Monde Berbère*, last accessed May 10, 2013, <http://www.mondeberbere.com/societe/manifest.htm>.

In Morocco, the political turbulence of the 1970s (i.e., the multiple coup attempts on Hassan II) proved beneficial for the movement. The king's focus on maintaining power meant that Amazigh cultural associations were not targeted and were allowed to flourish as long as they stifled any aspirations of ethnic or linguistic political mobility. Groups such as the AMREC accelerated their efforts in capturing, promoting and distributing Amazigh cultural history, traditions and folklore out of offices in Rabat and Paris.²²¹ In 1978, l'Union du Peuple Amazighen was established.²²² That same year, a former AMREC member founded the Tamaynunt Association that focused on elevating the notion of a specific Amazigh identity.²²³

2. Multiculturalism and IRCAM in Morocco

Activist movements in an authoritarian system typically must behave differently and operate much more carefully than those in a liberal democracy. Both governments ban political parties based on ethnic identity or religious affiliation, although political parties as an actor have only limited power to begin with.²²⁴ For the Amazigh organic movements (i.e., those originating within each country) this means that most must focus on language rights since it is one of the few “safe” topics that can be addressed and advocated for.²²⁵ This advocacy for language rights has practical applications, however, since one major concern is the incorporation and appropriate use of Tamazight at government institutions such as hospitals and other social services in regions that cater to heavily Amazigh populations.²²⁶

In 1991 the MCA was created with a major aim to push for secularization and to combat forced Arabization.²²⁷ That same year a group of Amazigh associations banded together and issued the Agadir Charter on Language and Cultural Rights (le Charte

²²¹ Silverstein and Crawford, “Amazigh Activism,” 44–45.

²²² Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 57.

²²³ Silverstein and Crawford, “Amazigh Activism,” 44–45.

²²⁴ Laueremann, “Amazigh Nationalism,” 40–41.

²²⁵ Wyrtzen, “Colonial State Building,” 271.

²²⁶ Crawford and Hoffman, “Essentially Amazigh,” 122.

²²⁷ Bahaji, “Morocco’s Imazighen,” 9.

d'Agadir); this document demanded the creation of a national institute and the recognition of Tamazight as an official language.²²⁸ The charter captured a broader call by middle-class urban activists to battle back against government-sponsored “cultural marginalization” and to assert that Morocco’s character, narrative, history and policies should reflect its vital Amazigh component.²²⁹ While this call may not have been embraced by the rural Imazighen who were preoccupied with more pressing immediate economic needs, it stood as an important challenge to the state-sponsored status quo.²³⁰

This pressure built and provoked a public outcry when several Amazigh activists in Morocco were jailed, beaten and convicted for publicly trumpeting their Amazigh identity. The poor publicity surrounding the episode shamed the palace leadership into capitulation—garnering a public pledge from Hassan II that all Moroccan dialects (*lahjat*) would be taught in schools.²³¹ Of course even this pledge embodied a backhanded compliment of sorts. A pledge from the King that Tamazight would be taught in schools was, of course, a positive step but calling Tamazight a dialect most certainly denigrated its significance as a distinct and particular language standing apart from that of Arabic or *darija*.

Much of the following years in the 1990s proved not to be a struggle against the monarchy but against the rising influence of Islamism. In 1999, Johadi Lhoucine attempted to translate the Qu’ran into Tamazight but Islamists thwarted his efforts, earning him the attention of the government which forbade such work until they later recanted their ban in 2003.²³² On the surface this may be viewed as an overreaction by the government, however, certain complexities exist. A common accusation leveled at the dissenters is that the Qu’ran has been translated into many foreign languages without Islamic protest. The Islamists response and rationalization is illustrative of their mindset. They first point out that in these other countries, the primary population wasn’t Arab and/or Muslim. Adding to their argument they point out that in Muslim countries like

²²⁸ Cornwell and Atia, “Imaginative Geographies,” 260.

²²⁹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 123; Cohen and Jaidi, “Morocco,” 93.

²³⁰ Cohen and Jaidi, “Morocco,” 93.

²³¹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 31; Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 123.

²³² Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 34.

Pakistan, Turkey and Syria, the Qu’ran was translated into official state languages—not tribal dialects.²³³ Such reasoning is also likely behind the Islamists’ reticence at Tamazight being recognized as an official state language.

In March 2000, 250 scholars, artists and businessmen signed a petition penned by Amazigh notable Mohammed Chafik calling on the state to recognize the Imazighen as a distinctive group and codify (in some measure) their respect for Tamazight and Amazigh culture in general. Overall, this Amazigh manifesto charged that slights and discrimination against Amazigh are slights against all of Morocco. Their manifesto trumpeted nationhood as a more primordial construct in that they place the origin Morocco’s nationhood as one occurring prior the Arab invasion. In all, the lengthy and verbose manifesto made nine central demands²³⁴:

- The Amazigh nature of every Moroccan must be openly and freely debated at the national level. The “alternance” government is ideally positioned to moderate with the Prime Minister as the leader.
- A constitutional recognition of Tamazight as an official and national language.
- Government-sponsored economic affirmative action policies to be implemented on a temporary basis—focused on infrastructure, agriculture, industry, education and training—to bring them on par with the rest of the nation.
- Enforce the teaching of Tamazight at all levels of the education system. Government support for the scientific study of the language to enable competent teaching of it.
- Creation of a “national scientific commission” to develop a Moroccan (and maghribian) history syllabus that includes and recognizes (not denigrates) the role of the Imazighen. This commission shall operate apart from and independently from the ministers of education.
- Institutionalize Tamazight within the public sphere to include: radio/tv, judicial system, public administration, health care system, local/regional government. Train and employ Tamazight translators and interpreters to ensure equal access and use for all citizens. End ban (whether official or not) on registration of Amazigh names in State Registry.

²³³ Samir Ben-Layashi, “Secularism in the Moroccan Amazigh Discourse,” *The Journal of North African Studies* the *Journal of North African Studies* 12 no. 2 (2007): 165–166.

²³⁴ “Berber Manifesto.”

- The rehabilitation of Amazigh arts (i.e., literature, dancing, singing, architecture and ecoration) and equality of access and funding within the government (to a level on par with Arab peers).
- Recognition of historical and given Amazigh names for locations (i.e., villages, cities and regions) in the nation instead of their replacement with Arabic ones due to arbitrary Arabization. Rightful prioritization of Amazigh notables when naming public institutions (e.g., El-Khattabi is last on the list for avenue names).
- Qualification of Amazigh cultural associations for official state financial assistance. Equal financial assistance for publications promoting Amazigh heritage of Morocco as is received by ones in Arabic and French.

The manifesto ends by urging unity with their Arab countrymen:

We, the Amazighes, are brothers to the Arabs, wherever they live, owing to (a) our belonging to the Islamic “Umma” (Nation), (b) the strong ties which bond us to them, and (c) our shared history, characterized by mutual support in good and bad days. We share with them their hopes and pains and stand by their side in any just cause. As for our fellow citizens who are proud of their “Arabity,” just as we are likewise proud of our “Amazighity,” we jointly form one body. None of us - be it from them or from us – should pride himself with his lineage, because reliance on conceit is a proof for indolence and a deviant way to get preeminence, honor and wealth without making any effort nor laboring for them.²³⁵

Generally these activists espouse a pro-monarchy stance citing that Amazigh were members of several Moroccan dynasties. This stance, of course, makes them an attractive partner for the palace.²³⁶ This partnership hinges on the short memory of much of the movement in ignoring the historical slights and brutality perpetrated by the monarchy.²³⁷ It also, however, is predicated on realist calculus that recognizes the limits of an authoritarian system as well as the necessity of cooperation with the king.

While IRCAM is a state creation and viewed by some as a state co-optation of their movement, for some it represents the movement’s “foothold” within the state apparatus. For now though, it remains as only a foothold since the true power for the

²³⁵ “Berber Manifesto.”

²³⁶ Bensadoun, “The (re) Fashioning,” 26.

²³⁷ Ibid., 29.

implementation of IRCAM recommendations lies within the Ministry of Education.²³⁸ It can also be seen as North Africa's first foray into multi-culturalism.²³⁹

From 2002 to 2003, the Amazigh movement fiercely debated which script (i.e., Latin, Arabic or *Tifinagh*) would be used within Morocco. This standardization was an important step in consolidating a movement frequently splintered by various dialects and without a common medium for communication. It was also a necessary step in order to teach Tamazight in schools. Proponents for the Latin script (generally the urban activists and diaspora) argued that this modern script would provide a better medium for communication at the global level and online. Others argued that Arabic was already being used within Morocco and the government. This was also the view of Islamists opponents. Critics of this rationale responded that few rural inhabitants could speak or write the classical Arabic that was used by the major middle eastern media outlets. Finally, IRCAM's official stance (largely the monarchy's stance) argued that *Tifinagh* provided the script most historically faithful to Tamazight (and still used by Tuaregs in the Sahel); it also offered a potential future bridge to connect other Amazigh groups in North Africa.²⁴⁰ This bridge is an unlikely one though with the Kabylie having long adopted a modified Latin script.²⁴¹ Ultimately, the king followed the IRCAM recommendation, a move that many view as proof of the incestuous relationship between the IRCAM and the palace. By choosing *Tifinagh*, implementation within the rural education system must go slowly as there is a dearth of teachers able to teach the ancient script.²⁴² This slow pace created further alienation prompting seven IRCAM leaders to resign in 2005 due to a lack of any measurable progress.²⁴³

²³⁸ Cornwell and Atia, "Imaginative Geographies," 267.

²³⁹ Crawford, "Royal Interest," 189.

²⁴⁰ Cornwell and Atia, "Imaginative Geographies," 262, 264, 266.

²⁴¹ Maddy-Weitzman, "Ethno-politics and Globalization," 80.

²⁴² Cornwell and Atia, "Imaginative Geographies," 262.

²⁴³ Bahaji, "Morocco's Imazighen," 4.




Figure 6. Tamazight dialect Map (From Nuala Cowan, 2012)

By 2005, Amazigh activism through cultural associations flourish with over 300 of them falling under the MCA umbrella.²⁴⁴ However, as these associations still had to get permission from their local government to meet; this implied monitoring and oversight is an obstacle to effective mobilization and advocacy. Furthermore, in contrast to Algeria (where rural-based associations have much higher female participation) most of the members of these associations tend to be literate and educated elite males.²⁴⁵

The Amazigh Network for citizenship (AZETTA) espouses a platform focused on “democracy, secularism and liberalism.”²⁴⁶ They—as well as the MCA and OADL—have worked in concert with the General Assembly Human Rights Council of the United

²⁴⁴ Willis, “Politics of Berber Identity,” 234.

²⁴⁵ Crawford and Hoffman, “Essentially Amazigh,” 123; Goodman, “Dancing,” 17.

²⁴⁶ Cornwell and Atia, “Imaginative Geographies,” 264.

Nations (UN) to advocate for shortcomings in government recognition and application of constitutional laws toward the Imazighen. Under Section 12 (Minorities and Indigenous Peoples) of the UN council’s March 2012 report, several obstacles to progress were highlighted. These included: persistent inequality between Arabic and Tamazight due to unclear language in Article 5 of the Constitution (whether deliberate or otherwise, continued marginalization of the Amazigh culture, rights and language, the torture and wrongful imprisonment of Amazigh activists, and the subpar national platform given to promoters of Amazigh culture and identity.²⁴⁷

Overall, the movement sees secularization as a key component to the advancement of democracy and not necessarily as an idea exclusive of or undermining Islam.²⁴⁸ Islamists, of course, see aspirations of secularism as mutually exclusive and unacceptable within a Muslim state.

In Morocco, poverty has always been prevalent and the nation’s destitute traditionally had few, if any, recourses for action or mobilization tools. This meant that for much of the time impoverished Imazighen didn’t view their ethnicity as an instrument of any kind. With 50% of all Moroccans living in rural areas and of those 40–45% of them speaking Tamazight as their first language, this sapped their ability to mobilize effectively.²⁴⁹ At the small town, rural level, Moroccan identity is more closely tied to a local particular identity. A local village or tribe’s ceremonies and groups bind them firmly within their day-to-day routine. Thus, their day-to-day language grievances stem from a lack of access to basic social and health services because Tamazight is not incorporated into Moroccan institutions.²⁵⁰ It is only in the major urban areas, that this identity expands to the international (e.g., Amazigh speakers and musicians from other countries). Technology, however, has begun to change these same people’s identity and awareness. In other words, they no longer see themselves as just “poor” but instead are

²⁴⁷ UN General Assembly Human Rights Council: Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to the Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: 9 March 2012.

²⁴⁸ Bahaji, “Morocco’s Imazighen,” 13.

²⁴⁹ Crawford and Hoffman, “Essentially Amazigh,” 126.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 124.

beginning to view themselves as “poor and Berber.” This new rural awareness coupled with the long-standing anger of unemployed urbanites may produce radicalization in the future if unaddressed.²⁵¹

3. Algeria’s Berber Spring and beyond

With a more repressive regime, much of the Amazigh resistance in Algeria was created and supported by the diaspora in France. Throughout the 1980s more than half of all Algerian émigrés were Amazigh.²⁵² Within Algeria’s borders themselves, Amazigh resistance and protest continues to stem from where it is most concentrated—in Kabyle. The Amazigh movement in Algeria used two different political parties (the RCD and FFS as discussed in the previous chapter) and one association (the MCB) to struggle for two goals: state democratization and the inclusion of Tamazight and Amazigh culture as essential tenets of Algerian identity. Much of the movement’s galvanization in this era stemmed from the decades of linguistic and cultural repression by successive regimes. A generation of Kabyle students had grown up in schools where they were physically beaten if they even spoke Tamazight—all this while the Algerian elite preached Arabization and then sent their children to expensive French schools.²⁵³ Analysis is further complicated by the deep connection between the Amazigh elite and France (as well as with the French language). With much of the movement’s intellectual vision coming from the diaspora in Paris, Imazighen do not all consider the French language and Algerian identity and pride as antithetical.²⁵⁴ This viewpoint, of course, runs in stark contrast with Arabization.

On 10 March 1980, the governor of Kabyle cancelled an Amazigh poetry reading by Mouloud Mammeri in Tizi Ouzou, an intellectual and commercial Amazigh stronghold. This action (and the government’s decision four months earlier to speed up Arabization in the education system) led to protests in Tizi Ouzou but also ones by students at the University in Algiers, prompting more widespread protests throughout

²⁵¹ Crawford, “Royal Interest,” 187.

²⁵² Nisan, *Minorities*, 2nd ed., 67.

²⁵³ Sharkey, “Language and Conflict,” 438.

²⁵⁴ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 115.

Kabylie that lasted for nearly two months. All of this dissent provoked an over vigilant government response that allegedly killed 30–50 Amazigh protesters that month. This government's overreaction was further magnified by their lackadaisical attitude toward Arabist protests taking place at the University of Algiers during the same time period.²⁵⁵ This violence only served to motivate and solidify the movement in Kabyle, especially at the elite level. In this case, the actions of a largely student-led movement resulted in the establishment of a chair of Kabyle studies at Tizi Ouzou University and the reinstatement of one at Algiers University—two cultural outcomes. This outpouring of protests became known as the “Berber Spring” or *tafsut Imazighen*.²⁵⁶ It also marked a turning point for the movement, as their pro-democracy, pro-reform, counter-regime rhetoric would grow increasingly salient in the coming decades.²⁵⁷ It is likely that a contributing factor to this mass protests was that the first wave of Kabyles to endure the educational Arabization process had come of age in 1980.²⁵⁸

In 1981 more student protests erupted in the springtime commemoration of the “Berber Spring.” This yearly celebration and remembrance remains a poignant mobilizer and concrete evidence of the psychocultural importance of community events such as parades and festivals. These yearly protests, the flourishing of the New Kabyle song genre and Amazigh poetry were indicative of the widening of the Amazigh movement from an elite-based one to one that connected to and was more relevant to the wider Amazigh community at large.²⁵⁹

When political associations were allowed to form at the local level was an important step. Their basic goals were the promotion of Amazigh language and culture but also on a personal (local) level to instill a sense of pride (instead of shame) in the rural traditions.²⁶⁰

When the government opened up the political system in 1989, the myriad Kabyle associations attempted to mobilize politically but were far outmatched by the politically

²⁵⁵ Sharkey, “Language and Conflict,” 439.

²⁵⁶ Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 57–58; Sharkey, “Language and Conflict,” 439.

²⁵⁷ Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 118.

²⁵⁸ Willis, “Politics and Powers,” 208.

²⁵⁹ Morath, “Categorical Divides,” 44.

²⁶⁰ Goodman, “Dancing,” 17.

well-organized Islamists.²⁶¹ The government's political clampdown in response to Islamist success at the polls would spark a civil war lasting over a decade—one that effectively hampered any meaningful moves forward for the Amazigh movement. Only as the war drifted into its aftermath was there any real opportunity at the start of the 21st century. This is not to say that there was no progress during this time—by the summer of 1989, 154 cultural associations had sprouted up in Kabyle with many more in the extending villages.

While many of the leading Islamists came from the Kabyle region, one should not infer from this a meaningful connection or cooperation between the Kabyle Amazigh and the Algerian Islamists. The active role of some Kabyle Imazighen in the Islamist movement stems more from the Islamist use of the region's economic destitution as a motivator (or instrument) for mobilization against the authoritarian Algerian regime.²⁶² When the Islamists' efforts ultimately failed (at least for that time period), these same inhabitants would turn to ethnicity as a mobilizing tool for regime change. As a cultural movement demanding recognition of a diverse and different identity, the Kabyle Imazighen struggle is antithetically opposed to Algerian Islamists' monolithic and uncompromising nature. Furthermore, some of the more militant Amazigh militants don't view their struggle as a social one but instead as a civic one. Thus, it is readily apparent that simply sharing similar grievances against the government doesn't imply cooperation or a shared worldview.²⁶³

The complaints and vision of the Kabyles was captured politically within the FFS and the RCD. Led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, the FFS' primary focus was on a national pluralist and democratic platform—during the decade of civil strife they encouraged dialogue with the Islamists. This was in stark juxtaposition with the Sa'id Sa'ai's stringently secular RCD that supported the government's violent battles against the Islamists.²⁶⁴ Activists were able to organize en masse in 1991, to protest the Arabization law passed that year.²⁶⁵

261 Layachi, "The Berbers," 204.

262 Layachi, "The Berbers," 205.

263 Layachi, "The Berbers," 205.

264 Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 120.

265 Abu-Haidar, "Arabisation in Algeria," 160.

The MCB announced a general strike on 24 September 1994 to express their anger at the government's treatment of Amazigh populace; this strike effectively shut down the schools in Kabyle. Six months later, this extended strike as well as the Amazigh spring parades, proved pivotal in forcing the government to meet with Amazigh leaders and their subsequent creation of the High Commission for Amazighity (HCA)—the body responsible for the introduction of Tamazight instruction within the Algerian education system—on 28 May 1995.²⁶⁶ The regime's concession came from a quid pro quo relationship in which the movement supported the regime against the Islamists.²⁶⁷

In November 1996, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment recognizing Amazigh identity in Algeria but stopped short of recognizing their language despite pressure from the HCA.²⁶⁸ That Tamazight was finally taught in the schools did serve to inspire Imazighen hoping for further recognition, as captured in the lines of Kabyle poet Lounis Ait Menguellet from that time period: “Oh, Kabyle language, Your sun has risen, your day will come.”²⁶⁹

In the summer of 1998, the GIA assassinated noted Amazigh singer Lounes Matoub who sang out and criticized Islamists who “used religion to paint Algeria Arabic.” He so ardently opposed educational Arabization that he never learned any Arabic while in school with the excuse that: “j'avais du mal à comprendre l'arabe” (i.e., “I was bad at understanding Arabic”).²⁷⁰ While his murder motivated as many as 100,000 protesters, their cries failed to garner any significant government concessions or protections.²⁷¹

The 2001 killing of 18 year-old Massinissa Guermah while in police custody prompted a public outrage to which the regime responded violently, leaving at least 80 people dead. These April protests stretched into the summer and beyond Kabyle setting off government security forces on a spree of torture and murder that left at least a

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 206.

²⁶⁸ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 40.

²⁶⁹ Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 160.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 151.

²⁷¹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 40–41.

hundred more people dead. This “Black Spring” proved influential in pressuring the government to make Tamazight a national language in 2002.²⁷² They also marked a departure from the Imazighen embrace of the FFS and RCD as instruments to effect change. This abandonment of the traditional political parties was a reversion to a more ancient practice of representation and action through the *aarouch* (old village hierarchical structure). This shift in focus eventually became the 2001 El-Kseur platform—one that mainly focused on social and economic issues (but also ones specific to the Imazighen). President Bouteflika attempted to deflect their momentum by promising to recognize the Tamazight as both an official and national language (only one of the 15 tenets in their platform). This success was overshadowed by the state’s lack of response to the other 14 points in the platform, one of them notably the demand for the withdrawal of the gendarmerie from Kabyle.

This El-Kseur platform would eventually morph into the Citizens Movement.²⁷³ This transition and the formation of the El-Kseur platform are an ideal example of ethnic mobilization occurring only after unaddressed widespread societal grievances.²⁷⁴ Thus, a part of a movement that consistently operated within the confines of a desire for civic nationalism transitioned to one of ethnic nationalism (and particularism) due to unaddressed grievances. This transition, however, is not a uniform one at all and is only applicable to a minority of the movement.

That contemporary minority is captured under the banner of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabyle (MAK) and is illustrative of the radicalizing effects of government repression. Largely organized by the diaspora, it reflects a marked dissatisfaction with the minor advances of the 1980s and 1990s. Founded by Ait Bachir and led by singer Ferhat Mehenni, the MAK protests within Algeria are localized to Kabyle but this is also indicative of much of the Amazigh identity politics within Algeria. The MAK also represent a shift from the civic nationalism most prevalent with the larger Amazigh

²⁷² Willis, “Politics of Berber Identity,” 232; Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 122.

²⁷³ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 207–208, 219.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 208.

movement to a more ethnic nationalism.²⁷⁵ More importantly it stands in stark contrast to the broader-based MCB with regard to its call for secularism above Islamic values. The core tenets of its platform call for the abolishment of *shar’ia*, relegation of religion to the private arena, and a liberal democracy.²⁷⁶

The majority of the Algerian Amazigh movement remains a civic one that desires that Tamazight be “officially acknowledged and respected in the context of modern, democratic states in which individuals enjoy justice and full citizenship.”²⁷⁷ The dissatisfaction with the progress of the civic movement stems from the state’s inability to provide much of the social security that perhaps one’s ethnic (or political-religious group, as is the case with the Islamists) could provide. This gap between the regime and its people makes voices within the movement that push for ethnic nationalism all the more salient.²⁷⁸ Today, however, the idea that Kabyle Imazighen are a repressed minority joined by “blood ties, history, culture and language” remains the prevalent view only among the diaspora. As noted in this thesis, however, such degrees of identification are not static and remain largely governed by the state’s level of response. The prevailing view on state language policy is succinctly captured in the words of author Kateb Yacine: “[If I am an Arab, why Arabize me, and if I am not Arab, why Arabize me?]”²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ Willis, “Politics of Berber Identity,” 236.

²⁷⁶ Maddy-Weitzman, “Ethno-politics and Globalization,” 76.

²⁷⁷ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 215.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Maddy-Weitzman, “Ethno-politics and Globalization,” 81.




Figure 7. Map of Kabylie (From June 10, 2003 ICG Report)

4. Pan-Berberism (Tamazgha): The Global Amazigh

In the late 1990s, technology and globalization spurred a pan-Berber movement resulting in both physical and web-based manifestations—the Internet not as a causal factor but as an enabling mechanism. While globalization can sometimes destroy local differences for the cause of progress and interconnectedness, in the Amazigh case, it has allowed geographically disparate groups to virtually and intellectually congregate.²⁸⁰ These efforts are hampered, though, by the differences in linguistic standardization. Attempts to standardize the Tamazight language only began in earnest 35 years ago and it continues to be a stove-piped effort without any real coordination across physical borders.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 72.

²⁸¹ Crawford and Hoffman, “Essentially Amazigh,” 121. For instance, Morocco officially uses the ancient Libico-Berber Tifinagh script while in Algeria and the diaspora the Latin script is used.

On the physical plane, the first World Amazigh Congress (WAC or CMA) convened in 1997. The WAC's roots stem from a meeting of like minds during a 1994 film festival held in Brittany.²⁸² Founded the following year, this group of Amazigh leaders has met irregularly since then with the last meeting taking place in 2008 in Meknes, Morocco. It is decidedly secular and pro-democratic and aligned more with western values politically. Following the attacks on 9–11, WAC Secretary-General Belcacem Lounes sent a letter to President Bush calling for the punishment of the attackers and for all those who espouse "human and democratic values" to band together to eliminate terrorists everywhere.²⁸³ The movement also supported U.S. action in Iraq, finding a kindred spirit in the Kurds and buoying a hope that Europe would pull its longtime support for the Algerian state. This organization is still a decidedly dysfunctional one as is evident by their outdated and infrequently updated website.²⁸⁴

Today, *Tamazgha* has expanded beyond the physical notion of an ancient Amazigh land stretching from the Canary Islands to Egypt's Siwa Oasis to a limitless online Amazigh globe (i.e., community).²⁸⁵ This virtual community emerged online with the advent of the Internet and the expansion of access (happening first among the diaspora in Europe who serve as the origin and base of most of these communities). As access to the Internet expands and cheapens, these groups increasingly meet Benedict Anderson's description of an imagined community (i.e., a group of people espousing a common memory, history, culture and territory)²⁸⁶ but also in the sense that nearly everyone in these communities will never meet each other.²⁸⁷

²⁸² Maddy-Weitzman, "Ethno-Politics and Globalization," 75.

²⁸³ Ibid., 77.

²⁸⁴ Congrès Mondiale Amazigh, last accessed May 15, 2012, <http://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org>. Attempts to research and find systematic proceedings from any of the meetings of their congress proves to be a futile endeavor for even the most determined researcher.

²⁸⁵ Maddy-Weitzman, "Ethno-Politics and Globalization," 73.

²⁸⁶ Benedict Anderson, 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised ed. (London: Verso, 2006).

²⁸⁷ Crawford and Hoffman, "Essentially Amazigh," 120.

D. CONCLUSION

Dedicated scholarship on Amazigh movements in particular (versus general Amazigh roles in the political system) is a relatively new field. Previous older segmented and particular scholarship existed in French and Arabic but it never systematically and holistically addressed the historical Amazigh. Gabriel Camps' 1980 work *Les Berbères* explores the ancient (i.e., before Christ) archeological and anthropological details of the Amazigh people but stops short of any attempt to address them within a modern political-social context (nor was this his intent).²⁸⁸ It would be another sixteen years before the publication of a book in English that addressed the Imazighen from a general perspective.²⁸⁹ In 1996, Michael Brett (a historian) and Elizabeth Fentress (an archeologist) published *The Berbers: The Peoples of North Africa*. Early on they point out that their book is the first of its kind in the English language—their bibliography is evidence of that—heavily populated with a diverse selections of French references. Their attempt, while laudable, devotes the lion's share of its analysis to archeological and ancient historical exposition. Furthermore, they concentrate most on Tunisia and Algeria and then draw their observations to a close in the 1980s period and have not issued an updated edition since. As discussed in this thesis' literature review, of course, Amazigh-dedicated scholarship has since witnessed a marked rise in both quality and quantity (albeit still a relatively small community of credible Anglophone scholars). A large challenge then for the native Amazigh movement has been to incorporate and translate the varied analyses and historical studies of their own ethnic people into a modern context that acknowledges both their key role and distinct identity. Ultimately the Amazigh movements, in their various iterations, have struggled to broker an acceptable, distinct position (and identity) in two countries whose elite ruling class constantly strives to contain and balance an Islamic identity and an Arab history within the context of modernity.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ Gabriel Camps, *Les Berbères: Mémoires et Identité* (Paris: Editions Errances, 1980).

²⁸⁹ Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress' book *The Berbers: The Peoples of Africa*.

²⁹⁰ Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 114.

This chapter has shown the overall evolution within the Amazigh movement that diverged into two separate paths for the movements in Algeria and Morocco. The separation began with two very different and influential post-independence power outcomes. In Algeria, the nationalists emerged as the political victors who were able to control, direct and set government policy openly hostile to a distinct Amazigh identity in the name of Arab nationalism. These same—ideologically at least—nationalists in Morocco lost out with their party (i.e., the PI) effectively excluded from power and political influence beginning in the 1960s. This also meant that the role of Morocco's Arab nationalism in relation to Amazigh particularism was tempered and mediated in the near omnipotent person of the king.²⁹¹

Geographically, the movement in Algeria has had a marked advantage (when compared to Morocco) in that any Kabyle action is typically viewed as emblematic of the greater Algerian Amazigh populace. The advantage of geographical concentration, however, limits their ideological efficacy as they struggle to build solidarity with other Algerian Amazigh groups. The majority of government concessions to the Imazighen aren't distributed through the Amazigh regions but only in Kabyle. This limits the political appeal of Kabyle rhetoric to the Imazighen living outside their region. In Morocco, there has been no base geographic stronghold on which the movement could build its foundation—its Amazigh populations spread out in remote, spread-out and inaccessible mountain ranges. These disperse population locales meant that the Moroccan Imazighen did not all hold the same corporate memory from the French colonial experience as in Kabylie (i.e., with regard to access to the French education system). They instead have had to maximize their urban influence and economic means to exert influence.²⁹² Central to this has been the challenge of balancing the extent of their demands with the attractive and frequent co-optive terms the monarchy.

Despite legislative lethargy and constitutional setbacks from each state's institutions, the movements have been effective in transforming the manner and the level at which the state must addresses the concept of a distinct Amazigh identity. This

²⁹¹ Willis, "Politics and Power," 212–213.

²⁹² Crawford, "Royal Interest," 186.

transformation has been a monumental step since the movements' independence origins. During the waves of Arab and Islamic nationalism dating from independence in both countries, Amazigh culture had amounted to little more than a historical "residue" or oddity that each state's leadership believed to belong firmly in the domain of simple backward rural festivals and folklore.²⁹³ While this type of cultural third-class citizenship still exists (especially among the Islamists) it is no longer the default mentality for government and society at large.

²⁹³ Maddy-Weitzman, "Arabization," 110.

IV. CONCLUSION

Sixty years ago the idea of a distinct and vibrant Amazigh identity existing in Algeria and Morocco would have been roundly rebuffed as far-fetched and unrealistic. In the countries themselves, such assertions would have been decried as unpatriotic and traitorous. Today, Amazigh culture and language is accepted and acknowledged in both states, albeit at varying levels. This path has been a hard-fought one, though, gained one small incremental step forward at a time.

In both Algeria and Morocco, the state's institutions were overwhelmingly the most influential factor with regard to Amazigh outcomes and shaped by their instrumental leaders. These ensuing institutional concessions came only after domestic or international pressure that threatened the established power structure (i.e, the *makhzen* or *le Pouvoir*). A key difference in these two structures, though, is in the executive branch. Because a hereditary king sits in the executive seat in Morocco and that nation itself has a continuous dynastic monarchic history, the executive possesses a historical legitimacy that is uncontested and indeed constitutionally unquestionable. A descendent of the Alawite dynasty dating from the 1600s, the Moroccan king carries the title “commander of the faithful” due to his status as a sharif (i.e., a descendent of the prophet Muhammed). Algeria does not have this same history or security in the seat of their executive branch; therefore, its president is forced to maintain power and legitimacy through both his position as well as his stature in contrast to the parliament. For the Algerian president, whether shams or not, two different elections have to be managed and manipulated (i.e., at the national and local level).

While a secondary influence, the Amazigh movements played an important role in taking advantage of institutional political openings—whether due to Islamist mobilization or liberalization periods—to shape the dialogue at a local, national and global level. A major shortcoming for both movements has been the absence of census modification from their platform. This addition would certainly enhance the legitimacy of their grievances and their salience on the global stage. Notably, this modification should not be

limited to self-identified ethnicity but should also include all languages and dialects spoke.

Morocco's comparatively peaceful independence experience set its nation on path less prone to reactions of blatant violence and outright repression (with notable exceptions occurring during the villainous tyranny of Minister of Interior Driss Basri and then Crown Prince Hassan II's brutality during the 1958–59 Rif Rebellions) toward opposing minority voices.²⁹⁴ Instead, the Moroccan regime established a clear pattern of co-optation as a strategy by which to deal with threats to the established power structure. This strategy, in turn, influenced and formed an accommodating more passive movement.

Algeria, by contrast, paid a steep and bloody price for their independence from its French colonial master. The ensuing power vacuum at independence produced a fevered struggle to consolidate power—both personally and institutionally. This severity would be emblematic of the Algerian pattern of response to dissent within its borders over the coming century. While this pattern of severity was often initially effective in stymieing attempts at mobilization, in the long term, it pushed the Amazigh movement within its borders toward a more radical path.

Today in Algeria, the Kabyle Imazighen have achieved more autonomy at the local level and have their own political party. This progress has failed to extend between their mountains—leaving the movement at a national level disjointed and largely impotent. In the future, two outcomes are likely to occur: increased measures of autonomy or even independence for Kabylie and recognition of the Amazigh identity as an integral part of the Algerian identity with the appropriate cultural and political outcomes.²⁹⁵ Continued regime repression, however, could further radicalize mainstream movement members and drive them toward extreme organization like the MAK—or more likely—push them towards violent actions against an un-invested power structure. This path could either put them in partnership with or conflict (more likely) the rising Islamist tide. The best strategy in Algeria may be to frame their movement as only a

²⁹⁴ David Hart, *Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco*, (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2000), 84–87; Nisan, *Minorities*, 1st ed., 60.

²⁹⁵ Layachi, “The Berbers,” 214.

cultural one and stay far removed from any ethnic nationalism rhetoric or ideology. This could enable them to broaden their base and galvanize the population at large against a regime unable to provide for its populace despite economic hydrocarbon largesse.²⁹⁶

In Morocco today, there are over 300 Amazigh schools open, six papers published in Tamazight, and the long established right to create cultural associations (albeit heavily monitored ones). Their efforts to form their own political party (the PDAM), however, have been continually thwarted (the latest attempt occurring in 2007). As discussed, though, Amazigh participation in the February 20th movement yielded tangible concessions from the regime with the constitutional recognition of their Tamazight as an official language. The gap between recognition and the practical application of that official acknowledgement remains a wide one that will continue to be exploited by a king focused more the retention and continued consolidation of personal power than sincerely addressing minority grievances.

In this evaluation of the saliency of the state's power to affect outcomes for the Imazighen versus the power of Amazigh movements themselves, one finds few direct intersections. Due to the structure of the political system in both states, ethnically-based movements are excluded by design from the process. This means that the movements most often advocate for culture concessions although they truly desire legal and political end states. The Amazigh struggle is captured succinctly in the following observation from the Berber Manifesto: "The harshest persecution is the one practiced under the wing of the law and colored with the colors of justice."²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶ Casper Wuite, "The Politics of Identity," *Fair Observer*, August 4, 2012, <http://www.fairobserver.com/article/politics-identity-berber-spring-algeria>.

²⁹⁷ "Berber Manifesto"

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APPENDIX A. PLATFORM OF DEMANDS FOLLOWING MEETING (11 JUNE 2011) IN EL-KSEUR

We, the representatives of the wilayas of Sétif, Bordj Bou-Arreridj, Bouira, Boumerdès, Bgayet, TiziOuzou and Algiers, together with the Combined Committee of the universities of Algiers, meeting this day, Monday, 11 June 2001 at the Mouloud Feraoun Youth Club of El-Kseur (Bgayet), have adopted the following common platform of demands:

- For the state to provide urgent care to all injured victims and the families of the martyrs of repression killed during the events.
- For the civil courts to prosecute all the authors, organisers and secret sponsors of crimes and for them to be expelled from the security services and public office.
- For the status of martyr to be granted to every victim of dignity during the events, and protection given to all witnesses of the crimes.
- For the immediate departure of gendarmerie brigades and reinforcements of the Republican Security Units.
- For legal proceedings against all demonstrators to be dropped, and for the acquittal of those already tried during the events.
- For the immediate end to punitive raids, intimidation and provocation of the population.
- Dissolution of the commissions of inquiry set up by the regime.
- Satisfaction of the Amazigh claim in all its (identity, civilisational, linguistic and cultural), dimensions, without a referendum or any conditions, and the consecration of Tamazight as the official national language.
- For a state that guarantees all socio-economic rights and democratic freedoms.
- Against the policies of under-development, pauperisation and reduction to vagrancy of the Algerian people.
- The placing of all executive functions of the state and the security corps under the authority of democratically-elected bodies.
- For an emergency socio-economic program for the entire Kabylie region.
- Against tamheqravit (hogra) and all forms of injustice and exclusion.

- For a case-by-case re-scheduling of regional exams for pupils unable to sit them.
- Introduction of unemployment benefit of 50 per cent the value of the guaranteed national minimum wage
- We demand an immediate and public official response to this platform of demands

APPENDIX B. SUCCESSION OF RULE FOR ALGERIA AND MOROCCO

Morocco

| | | | |
|-------------|---------------|---|---------------|
| Mohammed V | November 1927 | - | August 1953 |
| | August 1957 | - | February 1961 |
| Hassan II | February 1961 | - | July 1999 |
| Mohammed VI | July 1999 | - | Present |

Algeria

| | | | |
|----------------------|----------------|---|---------------|
| Ahmed Ben Bella | September 1963 | - | June 1965 |
| Houari Boumediene | June 1965 | - | December 1976 |
| | December 1976 | - | December 1978 |
| Rabah Bitat | December 1978 | - | December 1979 |
| Chadi Benjedid | February 1979 | - | January 1992 |
| Mohamed Boudiaf | January 1992 | - | June 1992 |
| Ali Kafi | July 1992 | - | January 1994 |
| Liamine Zeroual | January 1994 | - | November 1995 |
| | November 1995 | - | February 1997 |
| | February 1997 | - | April 1999 |
| Abdelaziz Bouteflika | April 1999 | - | Present |

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APPENDIX C. 2000 BERBER MANIFESTO DEMANDS

- The Amazigh nature of every Moroccan must be openly and freely debated at the national level. The “alternance” government is ideally positioned to moderate with the Prime Minister as the leader.
- A constitutional recognition of Tamazight as an official and national language.
- Government-sponsored economic affirmative action policies to be implemented on a temporary basis—focused on infrastructure, agriculture, industry, education and training—to bring them on par with the rest of the nation.
- Enforce the teaching of Tamazigh at all levels of the education system. Government support for the scientific study of the language to enable competent teaching of it.
- Creation of a “national scientific commission” to develop a Moroccan (and maghribian) history syllabus that includes and recognizes (not denigrates) the role of the Imazighen. This commission shall operate apart from and independently from the ministers of education.
- Institutionalize Tamazight within the public sphere to include: radion/tv, judicial system, public administration, health care system, local/regional government. Train and employ Tamazight translators and interpreters to ensure equal access and use for all citizens. End ban (whether official or not) on registration of Amazigh names in State Registry.
- The rehabilitation of Amazigh arts (i.e., literature, dancing, singing, architecture and ecoration) and equality of access and funding within the government (to a level on par with Arab peers).
- Recognition of historical and given Amazigh names for locations (i.e., villages, cities and regions) in the nation instead of their replacement with Arabic ones due to arbitrary Arabization. Rightful prioritization of Amazigh notables when naming public institutions (e.g., El-Khattabi is last on the list for avenue names).
- Qualification of Amazigh cultural associations for official state financial assistance. Equal financial assistance for publications promoting Amazigh heritage of Morocco as is received by ones in Arabic and French.

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